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Choose life. Choose a job. Choose a career. Choose a family. 
Choose a big television,  
Choose washing machines, cars, compact disc players and electrical tin openers. 
Choose good health, low cholesterol and dental insurance. 
Choose fixed-interest mortgage repayments.  
Choose a starter home. Choose your friends. 
Choose leisurewear and matching luggage. 
Choose a three-piece suit on hire, purchase in a range of fabrics. 
Choose DIY and wondering who you are on a Sunday morning. […] 
 
Choose your future. Choose life. 
 
PF Project featuring Ewan McGregor (1997). “Choose Life” (radio version). 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
“The Empirical Self of each of us is all that he is tempted to call by the name of me. But it is clear 
that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to draw. We feel and 
act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves. Our fame, our children, 
the work of our hands, may be as dear to us as our bodies are, and arouse the same feelings and the same acts 
of reprisal if attacked. (…) In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Self is the sum total of all that he 
CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, 
his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. All 
these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and 
die away, he feels cast down, - not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way 
for all.” 
 
William James (1890, p. 291), The Principles of Psychology. 
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THE SELF-CONCEPT AND THE ROLE OF 
CONSUMPTION AND POSSESSIONS IN SUPPORTING IT 
Can a biker still think of himself as a biker if one takes away his motorbike, leather jacket, 
boots and scruffy jeans? Let’s also take away this man’s suit and the briefcase that he wears 
during office hours. Is he still a business man? Does his self-view as an intelligent and well-
educated man conflict with his preference for Dumb & Dumber over Dostoyevsky for evening 
entertainment? And can he be a loving husband if he doesn’t buy his wife anything for 
Valentine’s Day? These questions relate people’s self-concept to some of their consumer choices 
and possessions. After an introductory chapter on the self-concept, this manuscript consists of 
three essays that will each highlight a particular aspect of the relationship of the self to 
consumption and possessions, followed by a general discussion. 
A person’s self-concept is an idea – a mental aggregate of perceived attributes of herself – 
which of course is larger than its prototypical symbols; those objects and behaviors that tend to 
come with it. Nevertheless, the examples above suggest the tension that may result when the 
self-concept and consumer choices and possessions are lacking consistency, thus illustrating how 
these two are intertwined. Consumer choices might provide concrete, observable proof as 
instantiations of an otherwise abstract mental image that is a self-concept. This proof might be all 
the more evident in the case where a choice culminates into a durable bond between a person 
and a tangible object, which is the case when a choice becomes a possession. The case first 
highlights that ownership is as much a psychological phenomenon as it is a legal one (Pierce, 
Kostova, and Dirks 2003; Shu and Peck 2011). Notwithstanding its pivotal role in human lives 
and society at large, the current level of understanding of ownership as a psychological state is 
rather undeveloped in literature. A second observation is that the self-concept is vulnerable in its 
manifestations. When consumer choices or possessions are at the basis of inconsistency or an 
otherwise unfavorable situation or feedback, it is not only these manifestations that are 
questioned, but indeed also one’s self-concept that is at stake. To a biker, a bike is potentially 
not only just a means of transportation, but might also symbolize certain aspects of the biker’s 
self-concept, such as a sense of adventure, freedom, or manliness. Taking away this symbol 
might undermine the underlying self-view. To explain this further, the next section will provide 
a brief overview of the self-concept and its relation to choice and possession, after which each of 
the essays will be introduced. 
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The Self-Concept 
People’s self-concept is the idea that they have about their self, the perceived internal cause 
of behavior. This idea is a cognitive structure that basically is populated with the answer to the 
question “who am I”, in the past, present, and future.  Importantly, one’s self-concept is multi-
faceted and domain specific, as one can think of himself as an intelligent person, but at the same 
time a horrible athlete, evaluations about two separate identities that are part of the same self-
concept. This knowledge structure is made up out of self-views that contain content (“I buy fruit 
(not candy) for my kids” or “I speak five languages”), attitudes (“being a good parent is important” or 
“intelligence is important”), and evaluations (“I am a good parent” or “I am intelligent”) (Oyserman, 
Elmore, and Smith 2012). It is clear that these three kinds of information do not exist 
independently, but that they support each other. For example, when being a good parent is 
important, buying fruit can support the generalized idea that one is a good parent. Vice versa, 
seeing oneself as a good parent can also impose the choice of fruit over candy.  
From the previous it is clear that a self-concept is not a passive collection of ad hoc pieces 
of information. These individual pieces of information are generalized into a stable knowledge 
structure – a self-concept –, which actively organizes our actions and thoughts, and imbues them 
with meaning. It additionally acts as a reference and source of motivation, providing rules and 
scripts to guide us in our actions and thoughts (Markus and Wurf 1987; Oyserman et al. 2012; 
Sedikides 1993). As such, the crucial role in our human existence of a clear and solid self-
concept can hardly be overestimated (Campbell 1990). 
A priori, the self is a “black box” to which little conscious access is possible (Wegner 
2008). Many of the processes that drive behavior and thoughts are inaccessible for introspection, 
because they are mere reflexes, they are automated (consider bringing food to your mouth), the 
result of unconscious thinking (Bargh 1984; Bargh and Pietromonaco 1982; Dijksterhuis and 
Bargh 2001; Epstein 1994; Lynch and Srull 1982) or simply too complex to consciously 
decompose and grasp (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wegner 2008). As the self-concept is a black 
box, it can only be constructed.  We infer our self-concept from its output: our behavior and the 
conscious reflections that it generates (Bem 1972). The self is therefore not only an executor of 
behavior, but also an object of observation and an observer of this object all in one (Baumeister 
1987, 1998). People build cognitive generalizations about their selves, derived from past 
experience to develop their self-concept (Markus 1977; Markus and Wurf 1987). This means 
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that part of the material to draw generalizations from is under people’s own control, through the 
behavior they display and the choices they make. Thus, the challenge of maintaining and building 
a self-concept also has implications when choices involve consumption and the acquisition of 
possessions (Dunning 2007). Activating a specific identity (parent) can lead to consumer choices 
in line with this activation (fruit) (Reed 2004). The same implication holds for possessions.  The 
idea that they represent material extensions of the self is one of the most influential in the 
domain of consumer science (Belk 1988). Possessions can also serve in symbolic self-completion, 
i.e. in constructing a self-concept that we desire for ourselves (Wicklund and Gollwitzer 1982). 
Materialism as a personality trait has sometimes been conceptualized as the extent to which 
symbolic self-completion is performed through consumption and possession (Shrum et al. 
2012). We also seek self-completion when we hope that the brand personality associated with 
the product we buy will rub off on our own personality, and to some extent this is the case (Park 
and John 2010).  
Because of the importance of a clear self-concept, people strive to achieve an accurate 
understanding of their self. This self-assessment motivation calls for diagnosticity as a criterion 
for selecting and processing information as input to the self-concept. Highly diagnostic 
information clearly distinguishes whether one scores high or low on an ability or trait, and 
therefore supports the desired accuracy of one’s self-concept (Sedikides 1993). Nevertheless, 
the subjective nature of the process of constructing a self-concept allows people to pursue two 
additional motives, other than accuracy alone. On the one hand, people have a need to see 
themselves as a moral, valuable, capable person (Steele 1988), and try to construct a self-
concept that is as positively colored as possible. On the other hand, it is crucial that a self-
concept is stable if it is to act as a beacon for people’s behavior. Although maximizing stability 
and positivity might seem contradictive, they often coincide because of the fact that both are 
assessed subjectively, through selective processing of evidence.  Furthermore, research indicates 
that both positivity and stability are more influential than diagnosticity in selecting evidence 
(Sedikides 1993).  
Positivity of one’s Self-Concept 
To maximize the positivity of our self-concept, we engage in self-deceptive self-
enhancement (Krueger 1998; von Hippel and Trivers 2011). An example of how this can 
translate into consumer choice can be found in vanity sizing: indicating a lower size on clothing 
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than the actual one, to allow people to enhance their bodily self-view (Aydinoğlu and Krishna 
2012). Thus, the clothing becomes concrete evidence of a desired, positive self-view. More 
generally, we selectively attend to positive information about ourselves, and we are critical to 
negative information (Ditto et al. 1998; Wentura and Greve 2005). After a performance, we 
selectively attend to comparison standards that make us look good (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and 
LaPrelle 1985). We deliberately underprepare to have an excuse for our poor performance 
afterwards (Tice and Baumeister 1990). This kind of motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990) is called 
the Self-Serving Bias, a bias that attributes favorable outcomes to the self, and unfavorable ones 
to external circumstances (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 1982; Heider 1958). 
Illustrative of the function of this bias is the finding that the Self-Serving Bias becomes stronger 
when a person encounters self-threat (Campbell and Sedikides 1999). 
The need for self-enhancement has by some been proposed as an explanation for the 
finding that people assign greater value to objects simply because they own them. This is 
probably the most well-known and widely studied effect related to ownership, and is known as 
the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Thaler 1980) or the mere-
ownership effect (Beggan 1992), two competing accounts leading to the same prediction. 
Especially the mere-ownership effect has been explained as a transfer of self-enhancement to an 
object to which one is associated through ownership (Beggan 1992; Nesselroade, Beggan, and 
Allison 1999). As mentioned earlier, it is important to recognize that ownership is not only a 
legal concept, but also a psychological state (Pierce et al. 2003). In fact, research indicates that 
legal ownership on the one hand, and feelings of ownership on the other hand, can exist 
independently of each other (Carmon, Wertenbroch, and Zeelenberg 2003; Etzioni 1991; Furby 
1980; McCracken 1986). Furthermore, there is evidence that psychological effects of 
ownership, and specifically effects related to one’s self-concept, are primarily driven by feelings 
of ownership rather than legal ownership  (Dommer and Swaminathan 2013; Morewedge et al. 
2009; Shu and Peck 2011). Essay 1 of this manuscript will investigate the psychological nature of 
this state.  
Stability of one’s Self-Concept 
Next to the positivity of people’s self-concept, its stability is equally important to be able 
to negotiate the uncertainty about who they are (Swann 1983; Swann, Rentfrow, and Guinn 
2003). Similar motivated reasoning mechanisms as those that support self-enhancement exist in 
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support of self-verification, the need to bring our experiences in harmony with our self-concept. 
Here too, we selectively attend to information that fits our current self-concept to maintain its 
integrity (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Holt 1985; Swann and Read 1981a). Probably the most 
illustrative finding about the importance of maintaining stability of the self through 
consumption, is that people are highly reluctant to take pharmaceuticals that would permanently 
enhance fundamental personality traits (like kindness or empathy), more so than peripheral ones 
(like ability to concentrate or memory). Also interesting is that this effect goes away if an 
enhancement is framed as an enablement, i.e. using a quality already intrinsic to the person to its 
full potential, in which case there is no alteration but rather an amplification of the self (Riis, 
Simmons, and Goodwin 2008). Furthermore, we often seek out brands and products that are 
congruent with our self-concept (for a review see Sirgy 1982), in an attempt to create ourselves 
a self-confirmatory social environment (Swann 1990). Unfortunately, it implies that threats to a 
brand can become a threat to the self (Lisjak, Lee, and Gardner 2012). This relates to what we 
will investigate in essay 2 of this manuscript where we test what happens when voicing a 
preference in the form of a recommendation ostensibly fails to convince others, thus potentially 
threatening both the preferred choice and the choice maker in their adequacy. 
Threats to one’s Self-Concept 
Although people can to some extent select evidence congenial to their self-concept, the 
vast range of behaviors they display and circumstances they find themselves in, inevitably will 
also contain counterevidence for some of the self-views they entertain.  Self-threat occurs when a 
– usually favorable and/or central – “self-view is questioned, contradicted, impugned, mocked, 
challenged, or otherwise put in jeopardy” (Baumeister, Smart, and Boden 1996, p.8), for instance by 
others, by one’s own performance, but also when others’ performance or claims about 
themselves comparatively make us come out bad, our leads us to question our self-beliefs. As 
illustrated in our opening example about the biker, external circumstances can cast doubt on a 
specific self-belief. The ability to draw credible generalizations of course depends on the 
coherency of the information supporting them. The answer to the question whether one is 
intelligent might not be hampered by the fact that one is a horrible athlete. In fact, the 
stereotype of the average braniac is such that below average physical capabilities might even be 
considered in support of a self-view about intelligence. A failed exam on the contrary might 
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indeed compromise this self-view. Furthermore, the impact of poor physical capabilities might 
become important if the topic shifts from intelligence to general success in life.  
Apart from selective processing to avoid damage to our self-concept, self-threat also 
invokes two common coping mechanisms. A first coping mechanism is to try to restore the 
specific part of one’s self-concept that is under threat, for instance by rounding up information 
that invalidates the threat (Fein and Spencer 1997; Greve and Wentura 2003), or by advocating 
the belief under threat more firmly (Gal and Rucker 2010). Consumption can have a 
compensatory function when the self is threatened, for instance by choosing healthy products 
when the confidence in one’s health is shaken (Gao, Wheeler, and Shiv 2009; Rucker and 
Galinsky 2008). Another classic example is the one of business students, whose feelings of 
security about achieving their future career are negatively related to their adherence to formal 
attire and possessions symbolic of this career (Kang, Sklar, and Johnson 2011; Wicklund and 
Gollwitzer 1982). 
A second coping mechanism is to reinforce domains that are not necessarily related to the 
domain of threat (Sherman and Cohen 2006). Indeed, literature shows that general self-
affirmation or affirmation in an unrelated domain can compensate for self-threat, a thesis 
denoted the “fluid compensation principle” (Steele 1988). This principle has an automatic 
component, (Cohen, Aronson, and Steele 2000; Sherman, Nelson, and Steele 2000; Steele, 
Spencer, and Lynch 1993) as self-threat invokes what is called “ego-boosting”, a compensatory 
strategy that makes people attach more value to anything that is self-relevant (Jones et al. 2002; 
Rudman, Dohn, and Fairchild 2007; Rudman and Fairchild 2004). Ego-boosting is even initiated 
proactively, for instance when one is subject to public evaluation (say, taking a test or giving a 
speech) or any other situation that might lead to self-threat  (Cohen, Aronson, and Steele 2000; 
Sherman, Nelson, and Steele 2000; Steele, Spencer, and Lynch 1993). Countering threat by 
temporarily giving up one domain for another might seem in contradiction with the stability 
requirement of the self, the need for self-verification. However, this coping strategy could be 
seen as an intensified focus on “who one really is” (Sherman and Cohen 2006), thus realizing that 
one’s self-concept is not dependent on the single domain that is under threat. While literature 
doesn’t seem to preclude that both mechanisms might occur simultaneously, a priori, direct 
compensation is more powerful in coping with self-threat (Stone et al. 1997). Nevertheless, 
attempting to directly counter a threat keeps that same threat salient, thus potentially 
exacerbating it (Blanton et al. 1997). Under these circumstances, indirect compensation outside 
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the domain of threat is more efficient, especially if the domain of threat is not very central to the 
self (Tesser 2000).   
Consumption and possession can be in service of establishing self-affirmatory resources 
that provide a proactive buffer for threat, for instance by choosing status products (Sivanathan 
and Pettit 2010). Possessions also relate the self to the past because they store and cue the 
memories and feelings that link people with their historical identity, their “self” of the past (Belk 
1990; Burris and Rempel 2004). This stabilizing and consolidating function (Schultz Kleine, 
Kleine, and Allen 1995) increases in importance with age, making possessions like these a 
personal archive and museum of one’s life (Belk 1988). The stabilizing function of possessions is 
also turned to when life transitions (McCracken 1987) or life altering events (Csikszentmihalyi 
and Rochberg-Halton 1981) compromise the stability of one’s self-concept. In this respect, it is 
striking to see how uncertainty about the self leads to a greater tendency to see one’s possessions 
as self-expressive – possessions that are concrete, material, stable, persistent pieces of evidence, 
contrary to the more vulnerable self-beliefs that one entertains (Morrison and Johnson 2011). 
All of this testifies to the principle that consumption and possessions are closely intertwined with 
the self-concept (Ahuvia 2005). More specifically, if mere ownership has the power to transform 
an ordinary object into something that represents the self, this makes us wonder about the 
psychological nature of ownership, and the difference in mental representation between objects 
that are owned, and those that are not. This will be the topic of Essay 1, which we will introduce 
below. Afterwards, Essays 2 and 3 will be introduced. Given the close relationship between 
choice and the self, any choice comprises a risk of self-threat. Essays 2 and 3 both will deal with 
previously uninvestigated applications of this general principle. 
INTRODUCTION TO ESSAY 1 
There is no image, no painting, no visible trait, which can express the relation that constitutes 
property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere conception of the mind.  
(Bentham 1864, p.112) 
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In many of the previously mentioned findings, ownership is a necessary condition for 
objects to become representatives of the self (Barone, Shimp, and Sprott 1999). Simply 
considering an object as “mine” instead of “not mine” can instantly change the significance of that 
object from meaningless to meaning “me”, with for instance effects on the assigned value 
(Beggan 1992; Kahneman et al. 1991; Thaler 1980) and recollection (Cunningham et al. 2008; 
van den Bos et al. 2010) of objects.  The question then becomes what the difference is in mental 
image of an object when it is a possession, and that exact same object when it is not? 
Existing literature proposes possessions as strongly associated to the self (Ahuvia 2005; 
Beggan and Brown 1994; Pierce et al. 2003), an association also called attachment (Ball and 
Tasaki 1992) or psychological ownership (Peck and Shu 2009; Pierce et al. 2003; Shu and Peck 
2011). Although these definitions have led to important advances in the understanding of 
ownership effects, they are rather descriptive. They provide us with little information about how 
an object is mentally processed because of ownership, in comparison to when ownership is 
absent. They do not define ownership as a unique phenomenon, as one can be attached to or 
associated with many things. Some at first sight would hardly qualify as potential possessions – 
like other people or the university one attended – although theoretical literature claims that 
feelings of ownership can indeed exist over other people, ideas, places, work and other entities 
(Belk 1988; James 1890), all of which seem to have in common with possessions that they to 
some extent shape the self. Given empirical validation of this theoretical literature, it would 
therefore make sense to see ownership as a specific instance of a broad, fundamental 
psychological phenomenon. However, much of the existing literature discusses ownership as a 
phenomenon separate of other kinds of associations, making abstraction of underlying or related 
processes.  
In essay 1, we argue that ownership qualifies as a dimension of psychological distance. 
Psychological distance is a well-defined (Trope and Liberman 2010; Trope, Liberman, and 
Wakslak 2007) psychological construct, recently integrated with Construal Level Theory (CLT) 
(Bar-Anan, Liberman, and Trope 2006; Trope and Liberman 2010). Other distance dimensions 
include social distance, physical distance and distance in time (Fujita et al. 2006; Liberman and 
Trope 2008). As distance dimensions are interrelated, qualifying the association of ownership as 
a dimension of psychological distance relates it to other associations, for instance associations to 
other people. 
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 Our results are informative about the mental representation of both possessions and 
ownership as an association. We find that possessions are mentally represented at lower 
construal, in a more detailed, more focused way than similar objects that are not owned. 
Importantly, we also find that these findings are bidirectional: feelings of ownership can be 
created by bringing objects psychologically closer, and by mentally processing them in a 
concrete way. Combined, these findings support the qualification of ownership as a dimension of 
psychological distance, which deepens our understanding of ownership as a psychological 
phenomenon, and provides new ways of interpreting some of the ownership “derivatives” we 
mentioned earlier. And as these findings show how the difference between a possession and a 
non-possession is to some extent similar to the difference between a friend and a stranger, they 
also help us understand the role of possessions in building and maintaining a self-concept. 
INTRODUCTION TO ESSAY 2 
While possession associates a person to an object that can then become a representative of 
that person’s self-concept, choice also associates a person to an option in the choice set, and this 
can make one’s self-concept visible in much the same way. A choice can be about the acquisition 
of an object and culminate into ownership. But even without such a result, choosing reveals 
preferences, goals and opinions that can be highly diagnostic of a person’s self-concept. Even the 
way a choice is made can have this power. Pondering many options or only some, or extensive 
search of alternative and information versus only limited search, or other attributes of choosing 
can not only demonstrate the significance of a particular choice, but also a person’s carefulness, 
rationality, decisiveness, or other beliefs that are part of the self-concept. Each choice – 
including the approach to it, the option selected, and any consequences from it – thus opens up 
the possibility of self-threat. This threat can either come from some form of negative feedback to 
the choice, which is what we will discuss in essay 2, or from experienced inconsistency between 
one’s self-concept on one hand, and the situation of choice, the available options, or the choice 
outcome on the other hand, which is the topic of essay 3. 
In essay 2, we look at Word-of-Mouth (WOM) behavior, consumers recommending 
brands, products and services to others in non-commercial exchanges (Arndt 1967). In a 
cluttered advertising environment, 92% of consumers trust “earned” media like WOM 
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(consumer reviews for example, i.e. media that are not paid for but earned based on the 
company’s performance) more than any other kind of information (Nielsen 2012). Our focus of 
attention is how the outcome of a recommendation in terms of successfully or unsuccessfully 
influencing the choices of others affects the person who made the recommendation. Making a 
recommendation of course necessarily requires a preceding choice of what to recommend. 
Given our argument up to this point, the evaluation of a choice by means of accepting or 
rejecting its recommendation can quickly turn into a perceived evaluation of the person that 
made the choice in the first place. Referral failure – seeing one’s recommendation rejected – can 
therefore be threatening to the self. Our findings support this hypothesis, distinguishing between 
referral failure that threatens central versus peripheral self-views, and showing that the effects of 
this threat are attenuated when enough self-affirmatory resources are available (Steele et al. 
1993). Furthermore, we find that coping with self-threat not only occurs by means of a specific 
choice of product that is symbolic of the threatened self-view (Gao et al. 2009), but also by 
means of choosing mode. More specifically, we find that in response to referral failure, 
participants make subsequent choices in a self-determined way, ignoring external sources of 
information and influence. This behavior is in line with literature that proposes self-determined 
behavior as a way of restoring and building one’s self-concept (Deci and Ryan 1987), a 
mechanism that might be particularly appropriate in a situation of referral failure. As the most 
prominent self-view under threat might be that of a capable and adequate decision maker, 
making decisions without external guidance might be the most convincing way of compensating 
for this threat. 
INTRODUCTION TO ESSAY 3 
While a choice can be the target of feedback that questions the self, the introduction to 
the previous essay also discusses how choices can be in service of reestablishing the self as well. 
The third essay will further elaborate on this.  
Research shows that even very subtle influences can unsettle self-view confidence, 
subsequently leading to self-bolstering choices to affirm the shaken self-view (Gao et al. 2009; 
Rudman et al. 2007; Rudman and Fairchild 2004). External circumstances can drive one’s 
behavior away from what would be consistent with one’s self-concept. After an afternoon of 
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shopping and choosing clothing for his wife and kids, a man might feel the need to do something 
“manly” afterwards, like watching a game of soccer (also see Willer et al. 2013). That result 
might be true regardless of whether this man does the shopping voluntarily or is somewhat 
forced by his family: compensation might be a response to an internal conflict between different 
identities, or to a conflict between an identity and an external cue.         
In essay 3, we extend this principle to situational cues related to the risk a person 
perceives in a given situation. Risk in itself – regardless of the likelihood of potential outcomes – 
is generally thought of as undesirable, e.g. based on inherent uncertainty or dread of the negative 
outcome (Taylor 1974). This would indicate that people only change their behavior in response 
to an excess of perceived risk. Nevertheless, assuming risk can also signal to others that one can 
afford to bear the potential negative consequences. This costly signal can yield benefits like 
increased social status and access to potential mating partners (Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, and 
Fischer 2012; Griskevicius et al. 2007; McAndrew and Perilloux 2012). Much in the same way 
that assuming risk can act as a social signal, it might act as a signal to the self. Some risk taking 
might for instance be necessary to support a self-view as being an adventurous and confident 
person. Additionally, there is evidence that people seek a level of stimulation that is optimal to 
them, preventing boredom on one hand, and outright danger on the other hand. With perceived 
risk increasing the level of stimulation, assuming additional risk can therefore be desirable when 
one’s actual stimulation level is below the optimal one (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 1996; 
Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1992). An external safety cue might just be the cause of a below-
optimal stimulation level. 
Through this theorizing, we provide an underlying framework for the theory of risk 
compensation (Peltzman 1975). This theory states that changes in perceived risk driven by an 
external force or event lead to behavior that in terms of riskiness opposes the direction of the 
change in perceived risk. The risk compensation hypothesis received some empirical support, 
but also received some critiques based on the extensive use of correlational evidence, the lack of 
a solid theoretical framework and (almost consequentially) the lack of process evidence (Dulisse 
1997; O'Neill and Williams 1998).  
As explained above, both a self-verification account and an optimal stimulation level 
account provide a theoretical basis for predicting risk compensation. Our experimental findings 
conceptually replicate risk compensation, and our finding that risk compensation is moderated 
by people’s risk preference corroborates the existence of a target level of risk that people try to 
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maintain. Based on our theorizing, we also extend risk compensation theory, showing that a 
safety cue can be compensated outside of the domain where it originated. In other words, risk 
compensation is not a direct reaction to a cue, but a mechanism aimed at keeping a target level 
of risk experience by any means available. 
These findings not only support and develop the theory of risk compensation. They also 
provide additional theoretical insight into the many findings in consumer literature that – often 
based on literature specific to the domain of the finding rather than on this general theory – 
seem to rely on risk compensation as a general principle (see for instance Bolton, Cohen, and 
Bloom 2006; Kahn and Isen 1993; Mandel 2003). 

- 15 - 
 
ESSAY 1: A BIRD IN THE HAND IS CLOSE, 
NOW, CERTAIN, AND YOURS:  
OWNERSHIP AS PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE 
 
Abstract 
Existing definitions propose psychological ownership to be an association between a 
person and an object, which helps to understand many of the effects related to ownership.  
Nevertheless, these definitions do not make similarities or differences with other kinds of 
associations – e.g. to people or places – explicit, nor do they provide much information on 
whether and how an object is mentally processed differently when it is a possession. Building on 
Construal Level Theory, we find in our studies that possessions are mentally processed at a low 
construal level, in a concrete, focused, and detailed way (1), that ownership is interrelated with 
known dimensions of psychological distance (2), and that processing objects at low construal 
leads to psychological ownership over those objects. Based on these results, we propose 
psychological ownership to qualify as a dimension of psychological distance. The resulting 
theoretical framework provides a new perspective on some well-known effects related to 
ownership. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Mine" is a small word. […] It is deceptive in its power and importance. […] It is 
ubiquitous, but invisible. It controls our behavior, but we rarely notice, as we move about our 
world restricting ourselves to narrow walkways and to those places for which we have keys 
(Rudmin 1994, p.55). 
 
Ownership creates a special status for objects. Mere ownership of objects as common as 
pens and mugs almost instantaneously leads to increased liking (Beggan 1992; Huang, Wang, 
and Shi 2009), increased valuation (i.e. the Endowment Effect)(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 
1990; Thaler 1980), and enhanced memory for the object (Cunningham et al. 2008; van den Bos 
et al. 2010). Ownership to some extent seems to render objects more important, unique and 
irreplaceable in the eyes of their owners, and thus seems to affect the way objects are mentally 
represented and processed.  
Ownership as a psychological phenomenon  is referred to in literature as “psychological 
ownership” (Pierce et al. 2003; Shu and Peck 2011), sometimes “perceived ownership” (Peck 
and Shu 2009) or “ownership feelings” (Reb and Connolly 2007), and is defined as a strong 
association between a person and an object  (Ahuvia 2005; Beggan and Brown 1994; Pierce et al. 
2003) or as attachment (Ball and Tasaki 1992; Wallendorf and Arnould 1988). In spite of the 
invaluable importance of these definitions in propelling the literature about ownership, defining 
psychological ownership as an association or attachment remains rather descriptive. This 
definition leaves us uninformed about the nature of this association, for instance about its 
similarities or differences in comparison to other kinds of associations like those to people, 
places, or events. It is also uninformative about the nature of the mental representation and 
processing of objects once they become possessions.  
Ownership and its effects are often studied at the point of an ownership transaction, i.e. a 
(potential) gain or loss of an object, as a result of a trade or an exchange for money. This is for 
instance the case in literature building on the endowment effect (Kahneman et al. 1990; Thaler 
1980), which is a dominant paradigm in ownership literature. Our research will focus on the 
psychological nature of ownership as a continuing state, rather than a variable in a transaction. 
To seek further insight into the psychological nature of this state, as well as the mental 
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representation of possessions, our research will build on the Construal Level Theory (CLT) of 
psychological distance (Trope and Liberman 2010) to argue that ownership qualifies as a 
dimension of psychological distance, and that possessions – compared to identical objects not 
owned – are mentally represented at a low level of construal.  
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
According to CLT literature, psychological distance is the subjective remoteness of an 
experienced stimulus (Amit, Algom, and Trope 2009). With the self as a central reference 
point, psychological distance needs to be traversed to the extent that mental representations 
involve anything beyond one’s immediate experience. Traversing psychological distance requires 
a high level of construal, mentally representing things in a more abstract way, with a focus on 
context, structure and core features, end goals and reasons. Mental representations of 
psychologically proximal concepts on the other hand are executed at a low level of construal and 
are concrete, more vivid, focused on detail, with less distinction between core and incidental 
features, and more in terms of actions and means (Liberman and Trope 2008; Trope and 
Liberman 2010; Trope et al. 2007). Four different dimensions of psychological distance have 
been identified, namely time (Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002; Liberman and Trope 
1998), probability (Wakslak et al. 2006), spatial distance, and social distance (Fujita et al. 2006; 
Liberman and Trope 2008). We propose that next to these four, ownership qualifies as a fifth 
dimension of psychological distance. 
To be considered as such, literature emphasizes that dimensions of psychological distance 
should exist outside of the mind and be susceptible to an objective definition, and not just be 
mental correlates of construal level (Liberman, Trope, and Wakslak 2007b). Ownership in its 
legal sense is an objective dimension, with psychological ownership as its subjectively perceived, 
mental representation. This is much like other dimensions of psychological distance which exist 
as both objective (e.g. distance in miles) and mental (e.g. perceived distance) phenomena. The 
perception of ownership often does not coincide with legal ownership (Carmon et al. 2003; 
Etzioni 1991; Furby 1980; McCracken 1986). People pick a chair at a restaurant, and 
immediately consider that spot to be “their spot”. On the other hand, people are legal owners of 
objects stuffed in their basement or attic of which the existence often has long been forgotten. 
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Similarly, the perception of physical distance, time, probability or social distance does not 
always coincide with reality, sometimes as a result of differences in construal level (Fujita et al. 
2006; Liberman et al. 2007a). In our research, we will focus on the perception and mental 
representation of the otherwise objective dimension of ownership which is a common approach 
in CLT literature (Liberman and Trope 2008; Trope and Liberman 2010). Thus, unless 
otherwise indicated, we reserve the term “ownership” for the mental phenomenon rather than 
the objective one. 
As mentioned earlier, the psychological distance to a mental concept affects the mental 
representation of this concept. A higher distance will lead to a more abstract representation of 
the concept, whereas a lower distance will lead to a more concrete mental representation. 
Literature shows that this relationship is bidirectional, i.e. mentally representing a concept at 
low level of construal will also make it seem more psychologically close, and vice versa 
(Liberman et al. 2007a; Trope and Liberman 2010). Furthermore, because dimensions of 
psychological distance map onto the same fundamental variable, all dimensions are interrelated. 
This also follows from the bidirectional relationship of psychological distance to construal level: 
thinking about an event that happened long ago for example, will invoke a high level of 
construal, which in turn might make the event seem more improbable and happening farther 
away. Thus, dimensions of psychological distance can be congruent or incongruent with one 
another (Bar-Anan et al. 2007). If ownership is a dimension of psychological distance, than just 
like psychological distance itself, it should show a bidirectional relationship to construal level. 
Furthermore, we should find that ownership, as an instance of psychological distance, is 
interrelated with other instances of this construct. These inferences will be developed further 
into hypotheses that will be tested in our empirical section.  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Psychological distance is egocentric; its reference point is the self, here and now (Amit et 
al. 2009). Given the strong relationship between the self and possessions (Belk 1988; Pierce et 
al. 2003), it makes sense to see possessions as psychologically close, and therefore mentally 
represented at a low level of construal. Indeed, a mental representation of possessions at a high 
level of construal would highlight abstract properties like their core features or the object’s main 
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purpose, which would imply that objects are more readily substitutable with others of the same 
category. People should be largely indifferent when one of their possessions is replaced for 
another one that performs the same function. This is of course not the case, as endowment 
studies show that people are reluctant to trade in even easy-to-replace items like pens and coffee 
mugs (Kahneman et al. 1990) and refuse to exchange perfectly fungible lottery chips (van Dijk 
and van Knippenberg 1996), even minutes after these items became their possessions. 
Ownership involves an association between a person and a specifically indicated instance of an 
object class (“This is my coffee mug”) rather than any other instance of that class (other – 
potentially physically identical – coffee mugs). We therefore infer that the mental 
representations of possessions take into account incidental features that distinguish them from 
similar objects (like history of usage, location, etc.), and we hypothesize that possessions are 
mentally represented at a low level of construal.     
H1 Ownership over an object, relative to absence of ownership, leads to processing this object 
at a lower mental level of construal. 
If ownership invokes a low mental level of construal, possessions are mentally represented 
and processed in a vivid, focused, detailed, concrete way, potentially explaining why they 
sometimes are perceived as unique, as level of detail in processing might explain why owners see 
object features that others overlook.  
Our first hypothesis claims that ownership and previously identified dimensions of 
psychological distance play a similar role in evoking low-level construal. According to CLT, an 
association to a person (e.g. friendship) decreases psychological distance – in this case social 
distance – to this person, and leads to a lower level of construal in mentally processing this 
person (Liberman and Trope 2008; Trope and Liberman 2010). Similarly, and according to our 
first hypothesis, an association to an object – i.e. ownership – leads to a lower construal level in 
processing this object. This raises the question whether ownership is interrelated with previously 
identified dimensions, much like these previously identified dimensions themselves are 
interrelated (Bar-Anan et al. 2007). This would indicate for example that one feels more 
ownership over a friend’s car than over that of a stranger, and that possessing a cup now yields 
more ownership than the promise of possessing a cup in a week from now.  
The most evident interrelation seems to exist between physical distance and ownership. 
Probably the most basic form of ownership transfer consists of literally handing over an object. If 
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the object is too large to carry, the old owner moving away from the object with the new owner 
moving closer can convey the same meaning. Related to this, the assertion that “possession is 
nine tenths of the law” (Erickson 2007) refers to the fact that the most straightforward evidence 
for ownership is holding the object as a possession. As an illustration, people have a general 
tendency to infer ownership from the fact that a person is known to be the first to hold an object 
(Friedman 2008), which, next to physical proximity, introduces the importance of temporal 
proximity of a person to the mental onset of an object. Furthermore, both touching an object 
(Peck and Shu 2009) and possession of it (Reb and Connolly 2007) have been found to facilitate 
feelings of ownership over this object. Of course, being able to touch and interact with an object 
as one’s possession is situated at the limit of proximity, and even goes beyond physical proximity 
alone. It additionally introduces an element of control which, as literature indicates, in itself is 
conducive to psychological ownership over the object that is controlled (Pierce et al. 2003). 
Conceptually, one could argue that control is associated to the security of possession, which 
introduces the importance of proximity on a probability dimension in building ownership. Based 
on the previous inferences, we come to our second hypothesis:   
H2 Ownership of an object is interrelated with other distance dimensions measuring the 
psychological distance to that object. 
Continuing our hypothesis development, the previous section mentioned that literature 
supports a bi-directional relationship between the level of construal at which concepts are 
represented, and the psychological distance to those concepts. Thus, a high[low] psychological 
distance evokes a high[low] level of mental construal – which if psychological distance can be 
instantiated by ownership corresponds to H1. Equally though, mentally representing concepts at 
a high[low] level of construal makes them seem more psychologically distant[close] (Liberman et 
al. 2007a; Trope and Liberman 2010). As far as we can see, the literature providing direct 
evidence indicating that construal level affects ownership is limited. With touch and possession 
facilitating ownership (Peck and Shu 2009; Reb and Connolly 2007), one could argue that these 
instances of physical closeness allow for a more detailed and sensory rich – therefore low-
construal level – examination of an object, whereas more distant encounters would necessitate a 
more high-level view. With this limited evidence, our ability to predict that mental level of 
construal affects ownership is therefore to some extent conditional on whether empirical 
evidence for the previous two hypotheses will support the claim that ownership qualifies as a 
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dimension of psychological distance. Insofar as this is the case, CLT then indicates that 
ownership should also be responsive to changes in construal level: 
H3 Mentally processing objects at a lower construal level, relative to a higher one, will lead to 
more ownership over those objects. 
This final hypothesis is the complement of H1 in proposing a bi-directional relationship 
between ownership and construal level. In three first studies (studies 1a to 1c), we will test H1, 
verifying whether indeed ownership leads to a lower level of construal. In a subsequent study 
(study 2), we focus on whether psychological ownership of an object is interrelated with the 
psychological distance to that object on other dimensions, which is what we propose in H2. A 
last study (study 3) will serve to test H3, assessing whether mentally processing an object at low 
construal level induces psychological ownership over the object. These three studies each form a 
step in providing evidence for our overall proposition of ownership as a dimension of 
psychological distance.  
In all studies, the data was screened for outliers based on the 3SD criterion. If a 
respondent reports values that are three standard deviations above or below the mean response, 
this respondent is removed from further analysis. 
STUDY 1 
In this first study, we experimentally manipulate ownership over objects, and test 
whether this leads these objects to be mentally represented at a lower level of construal than the 
same objects without ownership induction (H1). This study consists of three sub-studies, using 
different operational measurements of construal level as well as different objects over which 
ownership will be manipulated, to test the robustness of the proposed effect. For the assessment 
of construal level, both study 1a and study 1c build on CLT-literature that found that a lower 
level of construal leads to drawing less inclusive – therefore more – categories for the same set 
of objects (Liberman et al. 2002; Wakslak et al. 2006). In study 1a, this principle will be applied 
to the grouping of a set of objects, whereas study 1c will apply it in the decomposition of a single 
object. Study 1b will draw on findings that show that lower construal level leads to a more 
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narrow visual focus to assess construal level (Förster, Liberman, and Shapira 2009; Liberman 
and Förster 2009). 
STUDY 1A 
In this study participants categorized a number of objects into categories that they deemed 
fit, which is an established measure of construal level (Liberman et al. 2002; Wakslak et al. 
2006).  More categories are created when focusing on detail and individual instantiations of 
objects to make distinctions, which reflects a lower level of construal. Under high level of 
construal, categories are created in a more inclusive way, focusing on higher order abstract 
concepts without their specific instantiations. Thus, fewer categories reflect a higher level of 
construal. Our addition to this paradigm was that participants made a classification of objects 
either as owners or non-owners of those objects. Our expectation, in line with H1 that 
possessions are situated at a lower mental level of construal, was that owners would create more 
categories than non-owners.  
Material and procedure 
Participants were asked to categorize the same 38 objects in one of four different scenarios 
(between participants). Two scenarios indicated that the participant was the owner of objects 
that had to be classified; two other scenarios indicated they were not. Crossed with this 
manipulation, we used two different settings for the scenario to increase generalizability. In this 
study, we intentionally kept the two scenarios used in the non-ownership condition as self-
relevant as possible to avoid introducing self-relevance as a confounding variable. This was done 
by presenting the task to be completed as part of the professional duties of the participant.  
Setting: Moving 
 Ownership: In this scenario 1, participants were asked to imagine that they were 
moving to another house in their street block. We intentionally presented the move 
as local, to not evoke thoughts about psychological distance to a faraway location. 
Participants were asked to classify their belongings in stacks that ‘logically’ should be 
packed together in order to facilitate the move.  
 Non-Ownership: Scenario 2 was similar to scenario 1, but this time participants 
were asked to logically group the objects as a professional mover engaged to perform 
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the move. Again, participants were told that this would be done to facilitate the 
moving process. 
Setting: Insurance 
 Ownership: In scenario 3, participants were asked to imagine that they were in the 
process of drawing up fire insurance, requiring an inventory of their belongings. To 
facilitate the making of this inventory, and similar to the first scenario, participants 
were asked to categorize their belongings.  
 Non-Ownership: In scenario 4, participants were asked to imagine being an 
insurance broker that, analogous to the previous scenario, came to a client’s house to 
make the inventory. 
The objects to be classified were the same in all scenarios, and consisted of 38 items:  
chairs, rollerblades, sweaters, crib, candy dish, fish tank, board games, blender, bikes, coats, 
dumbbells, infant clothes, books, coffeemaker, puzzles, plates, CDs, toaster, toys, cutlery, shoes, skis, chess 
set, birdcage, ties, newspaper clippings, picture frames, juicer, ceramic figurines, glassware, boots, dolls, 
clock, records, T-shirts, lamps, skateboards, and paint brushes.  
The choice of these objects was based on work that used similar scenario’s to investigate 
classification behavior as a result of differences in construal level (Liberman et al. 2002; Wakslak 
et al. 2006). However, the item “baseball cards”, present in the original list, was considered 
irrelevant in the local culture and was replaced with “newspaper clippings”. 
Results and discussion 
Ninety one individuals (24 female), aged between 18 and 24, participated in this 
experiment in exchange for course credit. Two participants (2.20%) were removed as outliers. 
To test the effect of ownership on the number of categories used to order the objects, we used 
an ANOVA with ownership and context as between participants independent variables, and 
number of categories as dependent measure (log transformed, to account for count data). A 
significant main effect of ownership was found (F(1,85) = 9.17; p < .005), and occurred for 
both scenarios. A contrast analysis revealed that professional movers made fewer categories (M 
= 1.97, SE = .059) than the owners of the objects to move (M = 2.15, SE = .063; t(85) = 2.07, 
p < .05), and the same differences occurred between insurance brokers (M = 1.98, SE = .059) 
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and the owners of objects (M = 2.17, SE = .065; t(85) = 2.23, p < .05). No main effect or 
interaction effect involving context was found (all F’s < 1, ns.), and context is further ignored. 
For the same objects, and across scenarios, owners made more categories than non-
owners. This indicates that even when ownership is manipulated by means of a scenario – 
without the objects being present – ownership over objects leads to a more concrete mindset in 
dealing with these objects.  
STUDY 1B 
In the second study, we focus on visual attention as a proxy for construal level. Literature 
indicates that low construal level leads to more focused visual processing, with more attention to 
detail(Förster et al. 2009; Liberman and Förster 2009; Trope and Liberman 2010). This leads us 
to infer that ownership – if associated with low construal level – should lead to the same effect. 
In this study we will try to provide further evidence for H1 by investigating whether a possession 
is visually processed in a more focused way, compared to the same object without the 
mentioning of ownership. In line with the categorization task in study 1a, we also assess the 
extent to which owners and the control group perceive the object as being similar to an object of 
the same category. 
Material and procedure 
Participants were presented with a picture of a cup (Figure 1.a), and asked to look at this 
picture attentively. As a between participants manipulation, half of the participants were 
additionally asked to imagine the cup being theirs, the other half was told nothing about 
ownership. This makes our control condition a true baseline condition, not a condition of 
explicit non-ownership like in study 1a and in many ownership studies (e.g. studies building on 
the endowment effect paradigm). This also means that any result we might find could be 
considered conservative because some participants in the control condition may develop 
ownership feelings over the cup spontaneously. 
In a subsequent step, participants were presented with one of two pictures (between 
participants, orthogonal to the ownership manipulation), showing the cup with either an 
alteration on a more global, contextual level (the missing reflection in Figure 1.b), or an 
alteration on a more detailed, local level to the cup itself (the smaller size of the depicted brown 
cup printed on the cup in Figure 1.c). Participants were asked to indicate by means of a mouse 
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click as quickly as possible where the difference with the original picture was. If a more focused 
visual attention is associated with lower level of construal, then in line with H1, we expected 
that a focal change would be detected faster by participants in the ownership condition, relative 
to the non-owner condition. For a global change however, we expected the opposite: here, 
participants in the control condition should be faster to detect the change, relative to owners.  
 
 
Figure 1: The original cup (a), a global change (b), a local change (c), a comparison cup (d) 
       
On a next screen, participants were presented with a new cup, a comparison cup different 
from the original one (Figure 1.d). They were asked to indicate to what extent this cup was 
similar to the original one, on a ten point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 9 (exactly the 
same). At high level of construal, a cup is a utensil, something that can hold hot liquids. 
Therefore, any two objects that perform this function can be seen as cups, and therefore very 
similar. At low level of construal, the focus is on specific features and details, and thus 
differences between cups are highlighted. Because of the hypothesized lower level of construal 
under ownership relative to non-ownership, we expected the comparison cup to be perceived as 
more dissimilar from the original cup in the ownership condition than in the control condition. 
Participants were then presented with a manipulation check of the ownership manipulation, a 
single item measure asking them to what extent they felt the cup was theirs. Furthermore, we 
assessed participants’ general mood (Ledgerwood, Trope, and Chaiken 2010) as on one hand, 
adding an item to one’s possessions might have an uplifting effect (Isen et al. 1978), and on the 
other hand, mood has been show to affect construal level and visual attention, although opposite 
to the way it should be affected by ownership (Gasper and Clore 2002; Rowe, Hirsh, and 
Anderson 2007). 
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Results and discussion 
Seventy seven individuals (20 female), aged between 19 and 27, participated in this study 
that was part of a joint session of multiple unrelated studies, in exchange for a monetary reward. 
Two participants were removed as outliers (2.6%). One failed to indicate any difference 
between the original picture and the altered one; another took exceptionally long to respond 
(more than 3SD above the mean). Response times were log-transformed. An ANOVA analysis 
with ownership vs. control and contextual vs. focal change as between-participants factors, and 
reaction time of indicating the change as dependent variable revealed an interaction effect 
between level of change and ownership (F(1,71) = 10.14, p <.005).   
 
Figure 2: Interaction effect of ownership and type of change 
 
A contrast analysis indicated that participants were quicker to detect a focal change when 
they were asked to imagine the cup was theirs (M = 1.69, SE = .13), relative to the control 
condition (M = 2.12, SE = .13) (t(71) = 2.18, p < .05). The opposite was true for a contextual 
change, which was detected more quickly in the control condition (M = 1.45, SE = .14) than in 
the ownership condition (M = 1.85, SE = .13) (t(71) = 2.35, p < .05. Additionally, we found a 
main effect of contextual vs. focal change, where contextual changes turned out to be easier to 
detect (M = 1.65, SE = .92), than focal ones (M = 1.91, SE = .91; F(1,71) = 3.84, p = .054). 
This could be a result of our particular manipulation, but it is also in line with literature saying 
that images are processed top down, from a global level to a more local level (Navon 1977). The 
manipulation check of ownership was significant, with participants in the ownership condition 
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feeling more as if they were the owner of the cup (M = 3.87, SE = .41) than in the control 
condition (M = 2.59, SE = .35) (t(73) = 2.38, p < .05). Mood was not significantly affected by 
condition (F < 1, ns.) and is not discussed further. The results of this study indicate that in line 
with H1, ownership leads to a lower construal level, here operationalized as a more narrowly 
focused visual attention on the object itself, relative to a control condition where participants 
were more able to take into account the context of this object.  
An additional analysis indicated that owners indeed see their belongings as more dissimilar 
from functionally identical other objects. In the ownership condition, participants judged the 
alternative cup as less similar to the one they originally saw (M = 1.47, SE = .23) than in the 
control condition (M = 2.24, SE = .29) (t(73) = 2.09, p < .05), further corroborating that 
owners focus on the specific details of their belongings, and not on the higher level, abstract, 
conceptual form or function of an object. Where study 1a presented participants with objects 
that were not identical in function to assess in terms of similarity, the results of the current study 
thus conceptually replicate the findings of study 1a within a single product category. 
STUDY 1C 
In the third study, we relate our conceptual framework to the endowment effect – 
probably the most studied effect of ownership – which states that a person's willingness to accept 
(WTA) compensation for a good once they own it is greater than their willingness to pay (WTP) 
for the same good they do not own  (Kahneman et al. 1990; Thaler 1980). This effect has been 
explained as driven by ownership (Dommer and Swaminathan 2013; Morewedge et al. 2009) or 
loss aversion (Knetsch and Wong 2009; Novemsky and Kahneman 2005; Saqib, Frohlich, and 
Bruning 2010). Shu and Peck (2011) integrated these two explanation by saying that 
(psychological) ownership relates to whether parting from an object is perceived as a loss, 
whereas loss aversion relates to the severity of the loss. They positioned ownership as a mediator 
of the endowment effect, and thus a predictor of the monetary valuation of an object. 
Morewedge et al. (2009) corroborate this by showing that it is indeed the state before the 
transaction (owner or not) rather than the role in the transaction (seller or buyer) that predicts 
monetary valuation, which is important to highlight given our attempt to focus on ownership as 
a state. 
Our previous findings allow us to consider construal level as a gauge of ownership. If the 
strength of mental ownership determines the monetary valuation of an object and mediates the 
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endowment effect, then construal level, as a proxy of this strength, might have a similar role. 
Importantly however, if construal level is used as a proxy for ownership, it should be assessed 
while owning the object, not while selling it. Some literature has suggested that the intention to 
sell might change the cognitive perspective of the owner. Not only do selling intentions 
attenuate the endowment effect (Novemsky and Kahneman 2005), they may also induce a 
change in cognitive perspective from the object towards a (socially distant) potential buyer. CLT 
suggests that such perspective shift would also induce a shift from a lower to a higher level of 
construal.  To stay true to our research focus on ownership as a state, we will only introduce a 
potential transaction after having assessed construal level.  
Material and procedure 
Participants were asked to look at information about a beach apartment. The apartment 
had beach view (as illustrated by a picture showing the inside of a window, looking out on the 
beach) and was average in size. Three additional pictures provided an idea of what the apartment 
looked like.  
 
Figure 3: Apartment as presented to participants 
Furthermore, we manipulated ownership between participants, by asking half of them (in 
the ownership condition) to imagine they had owned this apartment for five years, spending 
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their holidays there. The other half (in the control condition) was told nothing about who owned 
the apartment. After this, we asked all participants to imagine walking around the whole 
apartment and list all places of significance in it (which could be rooms or parts of rooms, an 
example of the latter mentioned by some participants would be the fireplace in the living room). 
This measure was used to assess the level of detail participants used in their thinking as a proxy 
for their construal level. After that, counterbalanced in order, we administered several 
dependent, control, and process measures. We used a single item to assess participants’ 
ownership over the apartment (“to what extent do you feel like you own this apartment”) (Reb 
and Connolly 2007). Only at this point, a potential transaction was introduced, potentially 
turning owners into sellers (supra). As a dependent measure, we either assessed participants 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) or their willingness-to-accept (WTA) for the apartment.  Half of the 
participants were asked to imagine making an offer to buy the apartment, and what offer they 
would make.  Half of the participants were asked to imagine receiving an offer to sell the 
apartment and to think of which offer would satisfy them. Participants could not go back to the 
previous screens. As control measures, we assessed participants’ general mood (Ledgerwood et 
al. 2010), and asked them whether they 1) regularly rented an apartment at the beach and 2) 
whether they or their family actually owned such an apartment, the last two both as yes/no 
questions. 
Results and discussion 
Two hundred and fifteen individuals (111 male and 104 female), aged between 18 and 28, 
participated in a joint experimental session consisting of multiple unrelated tasks in return for a 
monetary fee. Eight participants were excluded as outliers (3.72%).  
For further report, all valuations are in Euros (at the time of the study 1€ equaled about 
1.32$). In a first step, analysis indicated positive effects of our manipulation of ownership on 
psychological ownership (Mcontrol = 2.76, SE = .27; Mown = 5.35, SE = .26; t(205) = 6.83, p < 
.001), which validates our manipulation. A similar effect was found for number of places 
mentioned (further referred to as concreteness) (Mcontrol = 6.67, SE = .23; Mown = 7.53, SE = .20; 
t(205) = 2.81, p < .01), and a marginally significant effect on valuation (Mcontrol = 224960€, SE = 
11054.02; Mown = 254266€, SE = 11498.18; t(205) = 1.83, p = .07). Noteworthy is the 
significant correlation between concreteness and ownership (r = .216, p < .005), which is in 
line with the findings of all of our previous studies. Furthermore, we find a significant 
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correlation between concreteness and valuation of the object (r = .223, p < .001), and a 
significant correlation between ownership and valuation (r = .151, p < .05). These three 
correlations highlight the role of concreteness as process evidence for ownership.  
In line with our expectations, we found that the total effect of ownership on valuation 
reported above was attenuated upon inclusion of concreteness as a mediator, i.e. the direct 
effect was not significant (β = 19848.09, t(205) = 1.21, ns.). The point estimate of the indirect 
effect on the other hand was significantly larger than zero (M = 9641.63, SE = 5119.59, LL95% 
= 1676.18, UL95% = 22224.50), indicating indirect-only (full) mediation (Zhao, Lynch, and 
Chen 2010).  
Including actual previous rent or ownership of a beach apartment in the analyses as 
covariates did not affect the findings at any point (all F’s < 1). No effect of the manipulation on 
mood was found (Mcontrol = 6.79, SE = 1.80; Mown = 6.98, SE = 1.46; t(205) = .39, ns.), and 
although mood did correlate with ownership (r = .19, p < .01), no further interactive effects 
were found (all F’s < 1), making an explanation in terms of mood of the effects reported above 
unlikely.  
STUDY 1: DISCUSSION 
With the three previous studies we have provided evidence for hypothesis 1, that 
ownership leads to a lower level of construal. The studies are complementary in establishing the 
robustness of this phenomenon. Different stimuli were provided for ownership: a set of objects 
in study 1a, a single object often used in endowment studies (a mug) in study 1b, and a single 
“object” susceptible to decomposition into smaller units (an apartment) in study 1c. 
Furthermore, different procedures were used to assess construal level, with study 1b focusing on 
level of detail in visual processing, whereas the two other studies focused on conceptual level of 
detail in a grouping (study 1a) or decomposition (study 1c) task. Also, studies 1b and 1c ruled 
out mood as a potential alternative explanation of the effects.  Additionally, comparing our 
manipulations of ownership across these three first studies allows us to generalize the effect of 
ownership on construal level relative to control conditions both with and without explicit non-
ownership. 
As an additional result, study 1c relates our findings to the endowment effect. Existing 
findings show that ownership mediates the relationship between endowment and the 
WTP/WTA gap (Shu and Peck 2011). Furthermore, the results of study 1a and 1b show that 
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the construal level at which an object is represented can be considered a proxy for ownership 
over this object. The results of study 1c bring these two accounts together by showing that the 
endowment effect is mediated by the level of construal at which the endowed object is mentally 
processed. Endowment with an object leads to processing this object at a lower level of 
construal relative to a situation of non-ownership. In a subsequent transaction aimed at 
measuring the endowment effect, this difference in construal predicts the difference in buying 
and selling prices. Building on the findings of Shu and Peck (2011), this result further supports 
the role of construal level as a gauge for the strength of ownership over an object. 
Taken together these findings provide extensive evidence for hypothesis 1, that ownership 
of an object leads to a lower level of construal of this object. In effect, they demonstrate how 
owned objects are mentally processed and represented differently from identical objects that are 
not owned, with more focus and more attention to detail. This might explain how possessions 
are perceived to some extent as unique and irreplaceable in the eyes of the owner, whereas non-
owners might think differently. The finding that ownership induces a low level of construal 
relative to non-ownership also provides initial evidence for our proposition to qualify ownership 
as a dimension of psychological distance, evidence that we will complement in the next studies.  
STUDY 2 
According to hypothesis 2, ownership over an object should be interrelated with distance 
measures to that object in other dimensions. Among the four previously identified dimensions of 
psychological distance (physical distance, time, probability and social distance), physical distance 
has been proposed as the most fundamental dimension potentially underlying other dimensions 
of psychological distance (Boroditsky 2000; Trope and Liberman 2010), which is why this study 
will focus largely on the interrelation of ownership and physical distance. In this second study, 
we test whether manipulating the perceived physical distance to an object affects the level of 
ownership over this object. Additionally, we test whether ownership measures are associated 
with a measure of inclusion of the object in the self, which we adapted from the Inclusion of 
Other in the Self (IOS)-scale (Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992). Originally used to measure social 
distance, an adaptation of this scale to measure ownership seems to fit our theoretical framework 
well. Its measurement of distance to concepts outside the self matches well with the concept of 
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psychological distance. Also, “inclusion in the self” seems to capture the essence of current 
definitions of ownership as an association (Ahuvia 2005; Beggan and Brown 1994; Pierce et al. 
2003) or attachment (Ball and Tasaki 1992; Wallendorf and Arnould 1988), and even might 
clarify how possessions are part of the extended self (Belk 1988). Combined, this scale might 
allow us to further corroborate the interrelation between ownership and psychological distance. 
Thus, next to a scale of psychological ownership (Peck and Shu 2009) and monetary valuation as 
its proxy, this study will use Inclusion of the Object in the Self (IObS) as a third parallel 
measurement of how ownership is affected by a manipulation of psychological distance. 
Material and procedure 
Psychological distance was manipulated through a procedure adapted from construal level 
literature, where visual perspective has been used as a manipulation of physical proximity to a 
concept. Based on a congruency effect, this manipulation was found to affect the speed with 
which words denoting either psychological proximity (e.g., tomorrow, we, sure) or 
psychological remoteness (e.g., year, others, maybe) could be identified or located (Bar-Anan et 
al. 2007; Liberman and Trope 2008). We adjusted this procedure to present participants with a 
static advertisement of a Parker pen instead of a word. The pen was depicted as lying on a small 
table. In a between participants manipulation, it was positioned either at the corner edge closest 
to the viewer which corresponding to the condition of low distance, or at the remote edge, 
corresponding to the condition of high distance (see Figure 4). Although differing in absolute 
terms between conditions, perceptually, the size of the pen was kept constant.  
 
 
 
After the presentation of the pen three measures assessed participants’ ownership over the 
pen. A scale measured psychological ownership (Peck and Shu 2009), and participants’ valuation 
of the pen as a proxy for ownership was assessed by simply asking them how much the pen was 
Figure 4: Manipulation of psychological distance to the pen 
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worth to them. This formulation avoided cues about the ownership of the pen. Additionally we 
asked participants responses to the IObS-scale (adapted from Aron et al. 1992), where the 
diagram representing “others” was replaced with one representing the object (see Figure 5 
below). Specifically we asked participants to indicate “which diagram represents best how you 
see the pen in relationship to yourself?” on a seven-point scale, with higher numbers indicating 
more inclusion. All measurements were counterbalanced in order. 
 
Figure 5: Inclusion of Object in Self 
Results and discussion 
Sixty nine students at KU Leuven (32 female), aged between 20 and 25, participated in 
exchange for course credit. No outliers were found. A multivariate analysis of variance showed a 
significant main effect of the distance manipulation on our three dependent measures, i.e. 
psychological ownership, monetary valuation, and IObS (F(3, 65) = 3.04, p <.05, Wilks’ λ = 
.88). Analysis of the between subjects effects revealed that relative to participants in the high 
distance condition, participants in the low distance condition reported more psychological 
ownership (Mlow = 3.36, SE = .29; Mhigh = 2.29, SE = .30; F(1, 67) = 6.58, p <.05), a higher 
valuation of the pen (Mlow = 5.52€, SE = .48; Mhigh = 4.07€, SE = .48; F(1, 67) = 4.53, p <.05), 
and a higher inclusion of the object in the self (Mlow = 3.87, SE = .28; Mhigh = 2.94, SE = .28; 
F(1, 67) = 5.81, p <.05). Furthermore, these three dependent measures are significantly 
correlated. Psychological ownership is correlated with both IOS (r = .52, p < .001) and 
valuation (r = .40, p < .001), which in turn are correlated as well (r = .42, p < .001). As 
parallel measures of a single construct of psychological ownership, these three measures show 
acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s  α = .71 for standardized items).  
In conclusion, these results demonstrate the interrelation between ownership and 
psychological distance (H2). To manipulate psychological distance to an object, we changed the 
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perceived physical distance to this object. Physical distance has been claimed to be a more 
fundamental distance dimension than time, social distance and probability, and probably the 
dimension from which these other three are derived as cognitive constructs (Boroditsky 2000). 
Our findings show that reducing psychological distance to an object induces ownership over this 
object, both measured as a psychological ownership and by its effect on valuation of the object. 
We also find an effect of our manipulation on a modified version of the IOS-scale (Aron et al. 
1992) where we substitute the “other” for the object to which the psychological distance is 
manipulated. This modification is in line with previous literature that applied the scale to 
organizational entities (Liu and Gal 2011) or brands (Reimann et al. 2012). While this scale 
should capture the cognitive overlap between a concept (in this case an object) and the self, its 
scale points quite obviously present different physical distances between this concept and the 
self. Nevertheless, the visual presentation of this distance is from a third person perspective, 
which distinguishes it from our manipulation of psychological distance. Furthermore, the 
original version of this scale was constructed based on self-expansion theory (Aron, Aron, and 
Norman 2007; Aron et al. 1992), conceptually relating it to theory that qualifies possessions as 
extensions of the self (Belk 1988). Our findings show that IObS is affected by a manipulation of 
psychological distance, and significantly correlates with a scale of psychological ownership and 
with monetary valuation of an object. Thus, this scale connects the two domains of ownership 
and psychological distance at several levels, and further corroborates their interrelation. Further 
implications of these findings will be mentioned in our general discussion. 
STUDY 3 
The goal of study 3 was to complement study 1 in finding evidence for the bi-directional 
relationship between level of construal and ownership. Where in study 1, we showed that 
owning an object leads to a mental representation of this object at a lower level of construal, 
study 3 will test the opposite direction of this relationship in investigating whether manipulating 
participants to mentally represent an object at low level of construal also leads to ownership 
over the object. In this study, we build on earlier findings in literature showing that cognitive 
perspective can alter construal level. Thinking about how an action can be performed (a 
feasibility perspective) induces a lower level of construal of mental representation of this action, 
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whereas thinking about why an action can be performed (a desirability perspective) leads to a 
higher level of construal (Liberman and Trope 1998; Liberman et al. 2007a). We apply these 
findings to manipulate participants into mentally representing an object at different levels of 
construal, and much like in study 2, investigated whether this affects ownership over the object. 
Material and procedure 
In this study, a cup was shown to participants on a computer screen. In a between-
participants manipulation of construal level, participants were then asked to either describe the 
use of a cup (i.e. how they would use it), constituting a condition of low construal, or mention 
purposes of a cup, creating a condition of high construal.  Participants were asked to write their 
responses in a box that could hold about five lines of text in a standard document. Next, 
participants reported their psychological ownership and valuation of the cup using the same 
measures as in study 2. 
Results and discussion 
Ninety eight individuals (49 male and 49 female), aged between 18 and 51, participated in 
a joint session of multiple unrelated studies, in exchange for course credit. One participant 
(1.02%) was removed as an outlier.  
To check whether our manipulation had worked as expected, two independent raters 
blind to conditions assessed participants’ statements for two properties: A) did participants 
discuss “a cup” in general (coded as 0: abstract), or the particular cup that was presented to them 
(“this cup”) (coded as 1: concrete)? And B) did they provide general, hypothetical descriptions 
(e.g. “you can use…”, “…is generally used…”, coded as abstract), or specific actions (e.g. “put 
chocolate milk in it at breakfast”, “drink coffee while studying”, coded as concrete). Inter-rater 
agreement was 88.78%, and Cohen’s κ was .84, therefore all rater’s scores were averaged into a 
single control measure. Analysis of this measure showed that participants in the low construal 
condition used more concrete language than in the high construal condition (Mlow construal  = .68, SE 
= .33; Mhigh construal = .50, SE = .28; t(95) = 4.29, p < .001).  
A multivariate analysis of variance revealed a main effect of manipulated construal level on 
psychological ownership and valuation of the cup (F(2, 94) = 6.01, p <.005, Wilks’ λ = .89). 
Relative to participants in the high construal condition, participants in the low construal 
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condition reported more psychological ownership (Mlow construal = 3.30, SE = .27; Mhigh construal = 2.16, 
SE = .26; F(1, 95) = 9.49, p <.005) and their valuation of the cup was higher (Mlow construal  = 
3.63€, SE = .25; Mhigh construal = 2.79€, SE = .24; F(1, 95) = 5.96, p <.05). Psychological 
ownership and valuation were significantly correlated (r = .34, p < .001). 
The results of this study provide support for H3. Mentally processing objects at lower 
construal level as opposed to higher construal level leads to higher ownership over these objects. 
It also leads to increased valuation, in the absence of a manipulation of legal ownership, even the 
absence of the physical object itself. Combined with study1, this study demonstrates the bi-
directionality of the relationship between construal level and ownership. It also complements the 
previous studies complement in providing evidence for our general proposition to qualify 
ownership as a dimension of psychological distance.   
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Our research set out to achieve a better understanding of the mental representation and 
processing of ownership and possessions. With regards to possessions, our opening quote 
describes how a word as small as “mine” puts us in the narrow mindset of “restricting ourselves to 
narrow walkways and to those places for which we have keys” (Rudmin 1994). Indeed, we show that 
possessions – relative to identical objects not owned – are mentally represented at low levels of 
construal, inducing a narrow, detailed focus on the object and hand. We found these results for a 
simple small object (a cup in study 1b), a large complex object (an apartment in study 1c) and a 
set of objects (study 1a). We also found them across different procedures for assessing construal 
level, with study 1b focusing on level of detail in visual processing, whereas the two other 
studies focused on conceptual level of detail in a grouping (study 1a) or decomposition (study 
1c) task. Additionally, we found our effects relative to control conditions both with (studies 1a 
and 1c) and without (study 1b) explicit non-ownership. These findings could for example 
explain customer lock-in mechanisms (Zauberman 2003). The low-construal level associated 
with ownership might inhibit the consideration of a wide range of alternatives. Consider for 
instance the difference in mindset between first purchasers and replacement purchasers, the 
latter probably operating at a lower level of construal corresponding to their ownership of the 
object that is being replaced. Something similar could happen for the initial purchase of a core 
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product (a food processor), where consumers will operate under high construal and be occupied 
with desirability of the purchase (why), versus the purchase of an extension of a product they 
already own (a grinder that can be attached to this food processor), that will keep consumers 
occupied with feasibility questions (how). 
Moving on from the mental representation of possession to that of ownership as an 
association, we show that a bird in the hand is literally worth more than one in the bush. 
Focusing on physical distance as a dimension, we find that psychological closeness of objects 
(holding it in the hand here, now, for sure) relative to psychological distance (away in the bush, 
after some time to catch it, only if you catch it) induces higher ownership over the object (study 
2). Ownership was measured as psychological ownership (Peck and Shu 2009). Increased 
monetary valuation and inclusion of the object in the self were measured as proxies. The 
inclusion measure was adapted from a measure of interpersonal closeness (Aron et al. 1992). 
These findings demonstrate the interrelation of ownership with dimensions of psychological 
distance (H2), with the variety in ownership measures corroborating the robustness of this 
result.    
Extending the results of study 2, we found increased psychological ownership and 
monetary valuation when participants are induced to mentally process an object at low rather 
than high construal level (H3; study 3), which together with the findings of study 1 demonstrates 
a bi-directional relationship between ownership and level of construal. 
Combining the previous findings, we conclude that ownership qualifies as a dimension of 
psychological distance, akin to other distance dimensions, and bi-directionally related to mental 
level of construal. As such, ownership complement the four known dimensions of physical 
distance, social distance, time, and probability. Much like the probability dimension, 
psychological ownership is inversely related to psychological distance and construal level, 
meaning that high psychological ownership is associated with low level of construal and with 
psychological proximity. This theoretical step might lead to a more explicit and comprehensive 
theoretical account of ownership, and fits with many of the existing findings on ownership 
reported by literature, as will be discussed in the implications sections below. 
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Congruency and interchangeability of ownership with other dimensions of 
psychological distance 
Different dimensions of psychological distance are interrelated in their level of construal. 
Thus, proximity on one dimension (for instance physical distance) will facilitate perceived 
proximity on others (and lead for instance to ownership), i.e. dimensions of psychological 
distance can be congruent or incongruent with one another, amplifying or attenuating one 
another’s effect on construal level respectively. To some extent, this finding corroborates 
theoretical predictions made by Hoch and Loewenstein (1991). These authors explain how 
proximity of a product, in terms of physical or temporal distance, or through social comparison 
to a person owning the product, can initiate an adaptation process to this state of proximity. As a 
result consumers habituate to a state they normally only experience under legal ownership of 
this product, a reference point shift that makes this ownership-like state the default situation. 
Accordingly, failing to actually acquire this product – and thus sustain this state – then becomes 
a relative loss, which leaves consumers with feelings of deprivation they would normally feel 
with loss of actual ownership. With physical distance, time, and social distance being dimensions 
of psychological distance, these predictions resemble our findings.  Nevertheless, conceptual 
differences also exist, as Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) propose an adaptation process – 
implying time passing – in which proximity gradually leads to ownership-like effects – implying 
that ownership and proximity are separate constructs. We on the other hand focus on the 
common features of proximity and ownership, proposing and finding that as cognitive 
constructs, ownership implies proximity, and vice versa. 
Our findings can provide a new perspective on some known moderation effects of 
ownership, reinterpreting them as (in)congruency effects. As a first example of this perspective, 
monetary valuation and ownership become stronger when the object is physically present instead 
of depicted or taken away (Bushong et al. 2010; Reb and Connolly 2007), or upon having 
touched the object (Peck and Shu 2009). These effects seem to be based on physical proximity 
facilitating ownership and its effects, in other words congruency of two dimensions. 
Similarly, we see that increasing social distance can attenuate ownership effects. This 
happens for instance when estimates have to be made as a non-owner about the valuations of 
objects by their owners. In this last case, agents underestimate value, which is a common agency 
problem (Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein 2000; Van Boven, Loewenstein, and Dunning 
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2003). In this case, incongruence with social distance impedes ownership effects. Nevertheless, 
the effect of social distance in turn is attenuated when the agent herself is the owner of a similar 
object (Morewedge et al. 2009). In this case, proximity from ownership of the similar object by 
the agent seems to induce a low construal mindset that reduces the social distance between the 
owner and the agent.  
Additionally highlighting the interrelation between ownership and previously identified 
dimensions of psychological distance, it is crucial to observe how ownership has a similar role in 
determining valuation as that of other dimensions of psychological distance. Both endowment 
effect findings and mere ownership findings show that ownership leads to higher valuation, and 
based on our results, ownership corresponds to higher psychological proximity. For other 
dimensions of psychological distance, literature similarly shows that people place a higher value 
on rewards when they are more psychologically proximal in terms of temporal or probability 
distance (Green and Myerson 2004), or social distance (Jones and Rachlin 2006). 
The extended self, and possessions and the self 
The idea of possessions in a broad sense as extensions of the self (Belk 1988) is one of the 
most influential ideas about ownership in consumer research literature. In this literature, the self 
is composed of everything a person can own, not limited to objects, but including places (of 
significance, regardless of factual ownership), body parts, ideas, memories and even other 
people. This broad collection seems to stretch the meaning of ownership, and the theory 
received some criticism for its lack of operational meaning and its metaphoric nature (Cohen 
1989). Nevertheless, we show similarities between the association to objects that is ownership, 
and other associations that can be expressed in terms of psychological distance. Our findings 
might thus provide operational meaning to “owning” close others, places, and recent events. 
Because vividness of information is associated with low construal level (Wakslak and Trope 
2009) this similarity might even be extended to anything that comes to mind easily and in rich 
detail, and in terms of mental representation therefore shares similarities with possessions (see 
for example "memories as assets", Zauberman, Ratner, and Kim 2009). Further providing 
operational meaning to the extended self, we find in study 2 that ownership is associated with 
inclusion of the object in the self. The original version of this scale aimed at capturing self-
expansion (Aron and Fraley 1999; Aron et al. 2004), which maps well on how Belk (1988) 
conceptualizes the extended self.  
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Exploring the interplay between the self and possessions further, literature about symbolic 
consumption has shown that ownership facilitates the transfer of meaning from objects to the self 
(Ball and Tasaki 1992; Barone et al. 1999) and from the self to object (Beggan 1992; Gawronski, 
Bodenhausen, and Becker 2007; Weiss and Johar 2011), which highlights the power of 
possessions to shape and maintain identities. Illustrative to this power, our findings put 
possessions at the same level as close others (friends) or places (your home). 
Related to the transfer of meaning, and especially bearing in mind that touch is associated 
to ownership (Peck and Shu 2009), substituting physical proximity for ownership would 
naturally lead to the prediction of contagion effects. Indeed, a T-shirt that has just been fitted by 
another person in a store is evaluated less favorably (Argo, Dahl, and Morales 2006), unless that 
other person is an attractive opposite sex other, in which case this T-shirt suddenly becomes a 
highly desirable item to buy (Argo, Dahl, and Morales 2008). Both these findings are easy to 
understand based on a motivation for self-expansion, where in the first case, the T-shirt is 
already “taken”, but in the second case, it is exactly this association between the T-shirt and 
another person that transforms the T-shirt into a means to decrease the distance to that person. 
Materialism and secondary ownership effects 
Our findings might also be informative for the understanding of materialism. Materialism 
has been discussed as adhering to values or beliefs that worldly possessions are a means to 
satisfying personal goals, such as happiness and success (Belk 1985; Richins and Dawson 1992). 
Based on our findings, and on the high involvement with possessions that seems intrinsic to 
materialism, we would predict a chronically lower construal level for people scoring high on this 
trait. It is striking how literature shows that indeed, these people have difficulties in empathizing 
with others (Belk 1985; Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002) and that they exhibit shortsightedness 
in intertemporal spending (Richins 2011; Watson 2003). Both these findings can be interpreted 
as failures to overcome psychological distance – to others and to the future – and thus both 
relate to a low level of construal (Fujita et al. 2006; Liberman et al. 2007a). 
As a secondary effect, ownership can escalate into territorialism (Brown, Lawrence, and 
Robinson 2005a) or possessiveness, defined as a need for exclusive control, and the 
unwillingness to share or collaborate (Pierce et al. 2003). Both seem to correspond to an 
exaggerated version of effects of low construal (i.e. high focus on the object, failing to see 
context, and failing to overcome social distance). Furthermore, prior research indicates that 
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lower levels of construal are associated with a prevention focus (Förster and Higgins 2005; Lee, 
Keller, and Sternthal 2010) which might explain how ownership can lead to resistance to change 
(Pierce et al. 2003), and which might warrant future research into an association between 
regulatory focus and various effects related to ownership. Based on these inferences, future 
research might even investigate whether focusing on one’s possessions induces a preference for 
conservative values and norms, driven by a need to prevent the potential negative outcomes of 
change.  
The endowment effect 
In study 1, we find that ownership induces a lower level of construal, which mediates the 
endowment effect (study 1c). Additionally, studies 1c, 2 and 3 consistently find ownership to be 
associated with increased valuation of an object. As most of these results are found without the 
introduction of a transaction, therefore without a loss to consider, they seem to support an 
ownership account as an explanation for the endowment effect (Dommer and Swaminathan 
2013; Morewedge et al. 2009) rather than a loss aversion account (Knetsch and Wong 2009; 
Novemsky and Kahneman 2005; Saqib et al. 2010). As mentioned earlier, it is remarkable how 
ownership seems to perform a similar role in determining valuation as other dimensions of 
psychological distance. Furthermore, our findings suggest an additional explanation for this 
ownership account, as we find that owners see objects as more unique than non-owners (study 
1b), and as something unique is scarce and therefore often perceived as more valuable (Brock 
1968; Lynn 1991). 
As sellers are usually owners, and buyers are not, our findings in study 1 seem to 
contradict those of a recent publication that found that sellers operate at a higher level of 
construal than buyers (Irmak, Wakslak, and Trope 2013). While we focus on ownership as a 
continuous state however, Irmak et al. (2013) focus on construal level during an ownership 
transaction. The higher construal level of sellers can be explained by the fact that they will no 
longer use the item, and thus have no need for feasibility or “how” questions, but instead are 
occupied with the desirability question of  “why” a potential buyer would need the item. The 
opposite goes for the buyer who additionally – once considering buying the item – might be in a 
state of prefactual ownership, with psychological consequences similar to actual ownership 
(Ariely, Huber, and Wertenbroch 2005; Carmon et al. 2003). Corroborating this point, Irmak 
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et al. (2013) in their first study find that sellers operate at higher construal than both buyers and 
owners, with no significant difference between these latter two groups.  
The difference between focusing on transaction roles versus on ownership thus explains 
these seemingly opposite results, and highlights the importance of the closing argument of our 
introduction to treat ownership as a continuous state separately from ownership in a transaction. 
Nevertheless, many owners become sellers at some point in time, and comparing our findings to 
those of Irmak et al. (2013) suggests that this might come with a dramatic transition in construal 
level. This transition might be conditional on whether one deliberately becomes a potential 
seller. In response to a request to sell, a reluctance to sell might amplify ownership feelings, and 
lower construal even further. On the other hand, the same reluctance might lead to thoughts 
about why to keep the object, a desirability perspective associated with high construal. Similarly, 
low construal for buyers might indicate that pondering the purchase has been completed, and 
might be reversed by the same desirability perspective if this is not the case. With literature 
showing that selling intentions attenuate loss aversion (Novemsky and Kahneman 2005), future 
research might further investigate the transitions of owners to sellers to non-owners on the one 
hand, and of non-owners to buyers to owners on the other hand. Assessing the role of level of 
construal, mental ownership (which would be prefactual in the case of buyers), and loss aversion 
at various stages of these transitions might deliver a more complete understanding of the 
endowment effect, and of ownership transactions in general. 
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ESSAY 2: THE IDENTITY-THREATENING 
NATURE OF REFERRAL FAILURE 
 
 
Abstract 
In four experimental studies we show that when a person has the experience of giving 
advice but that advice is not acted upon, there is a reduced openness to external information. 
We call this the “referral backfire effect”. We argue that this referral backfire effect is due to the 
identity threatening nature of referral failure: the referral backfire effect is attenuated (1) when 
the sender perceives oneself as having low expertise in the particular domain of referral and (2) 
upon self-affirmation. Accordingly, implicit egotism is increased after referral failure, reflecting 
the need to bolster the self against threat. Because referral behavior is considered to be an 
important predictor of business success, we discuss the implications of our findings for both 
theory and practice and sketch future research opportunities. 
This manuscript is adapted from Claus, Bart, Geyskens, Kelly, Millet, Kobe, and Siegfried 
Dewitte (2012), “The Referral Backfire Effect: The Identity-Threatening Nature of Referral 
Failure”, International Journal of Research in Marketing, 29 (4), 370-79. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Invite your friends to try Omaha Steaks and we’ll throw in a dozen free burgers. And for every two 
friends who try us out, we’ll send you a $20 Reward e-Gift Card towards your next purchase of $80 or 
more.” This advertising copy shows how Omaha Steaks, a mail order meat company that is 
recognized as an innovative marketer, tried to reinforce and incentivize the natural inclination of 
consumers to refer others in line with their own preferences. Imagine an enthusiastic fan of 
Omaha Steaks participating in this promotion and recommending the service to her friends. 
Because she will receive a gift card for every two friends that follow her referral, she is able to 
track the extent to which her referral was successful. However, what happens to the referrer 
when it becomes clear that almost none of these friends have followed the recommendation? 
Alternatively, consider the following example: imagine your new colleague asking your advice 
about the best search system for scientific papers. You recommend your preferred search 
system. Later on, you notice that your colleague still works with a less functional system. Again, 
what impact does this revelation have on you when your colleague does not follow your 
recommendation? 
In this paper, we address the question of whether referral failure has any consequences for 
subsequent behavior of the referrer. Although consumers refer others on a daily basis and are 
stimulated to do so through company rewards (Ryu and Feick 2007; Schmitt, Skiera, and Van 
den Bulte 2011), we are not aware of any prior research that addresses the effect of referral 
failure on the referrer. However, as referral outcomes become increasingly transparent in online 
environments, these outcomes represent an issue of growing importance.  
The existing literature indicates that consumption itself can often be considered a non-
verbal form of identity-expression (Belk, Bahn, and Mayer 1982; Reed 2004; Richins 1994) and 
that engaging in referrals makes consumption even more publicly visible (Brown et al. 2005b; 
Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004). Therefore, we propose that referral failure - the situation in which 
one’s advice is rejected - may in certain circumstances threaten consumers’ identities. 
Psychology provides ample evidence that identity threats motivate consumers to bolster their 
self-concept (Dunning, Perie, and Story 1991; Wentura and Greve 2005). One way to bolster 
the self-concept is to act in a self-determined way (Blanton and Christie 2003; Deci and Ryan 
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1985; Nail, MacDonald, and Levy 2000). We argue that referral failure invokes a need to make 
self-determined choices, void of external influence. We call this reluctance to comply with 
external influences - as triggered by referral failure - the referral backfire effect. Our studies will 
demonstrate the effect and test the underlying process in terms of identity threat. 
Whereas the proposed effect is relevant to many research domains, such as social 
psychology, organizational behavior, or communications research, it is useful at this point to 
highlight this work’s contribution to marketing literature, more specifically, in the Word of 
Mouth (WOM) domain. To the best of our knowledge, research on WOM behavior has focused 
on the existence and implications of referrals but has never empirically investigated the outcome 
of referral behavior on the referrer. Studies on WOM in an offline (East, Hammond, and Lomax 
2008; Laczniak, DeCarlo, and Ramaswami 2001) and online environment (De Bruyn and Lilien 
2008; Hennig-Thurau and Walsh 2003) have especially focused on identifying and targeting 
consumers with a larger-than-average impact on the spread of information. Spreading consumer 
information is not reserved for an elite group of knowledgeable Market Mavens (Feick and Price 
1987) or influential Opinion Leaders (Rogers and Cartano 1962). The ordinary consumer also 
engages in several conversations about brands and products every day (Keller 2007), and her 
joint impact on spreading consumer information is, according to several researchers, of no lesser 
importance than the impacts of the aforementioned elite (Godes and Mayzlin 2009; Smith et al. 
2007; Watts and Dodds 2007). The current project opens a new dimension in WOM research 
by focusing on the impact of this referral behavior on the sender’s subsequent behavior, rather 
than the receiver’s. 
REFERRAL FAILURE AS IDENTITY THREAT 
Referral behavior has at least two important features that connect it to consumer identity. 
Referral behavior reveals information about the adviser’s product preferences and opinions. 
Because many consumption decisions reflect a consumer’s identity (Escalas and Bettman 2005), 
shared information about these decisions will also reflect that identity. Additionally, referral 
behavior subjects this information with all of its potential identity implications to public scrutiny 
because referral behavior offers the listener the opportunity to ignore or reject the information. 
Indeed, self-disclosure is perceived to be risky in general (Olivero and Lunt 2004). In 
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accordance with this conceptual analysis, the literature suggests that one important driver behind 
referral behavior is the motivation to maintain and enhance a positive self-concept, e.g., to 
demonstrate to others that one is intelligent shopper or to reduce anxiety stemming from a 
negative consumer experience (Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004; Sundaram, Mitra, and Webster 
1998). By conducting in-depth interviews, Dichter (1966) found that 24% of the 352 
investigated (positive) referrals were explicitly driven by self-confirmation motives, including 
confirmation of one’s judgment capacity or asserting status. Additionally, it is not unlikely that a 
substantial number of the referrals explicitly attributed to other reasons (product-, other-, or 
message-related reasons, Dichter, 1966), were also partially motivated by self-confirmation. 
Furthermore, Von Wangenheim (2005) found that switching brands might result in a negative 
WOM review of the initial choice to self-justify the inconsistency demonstrated by the switch. 
Given that referral behavior is often motivated behavior, referral failure may be painful, which is 
a conclusion for which Dichter (1966) found some anecdotal support. Specifically, the link 
between consumption and one’s self-concept suggests that referral failure may threaten the 
referrer’s self, or a specific identity part of it.  
Identity threat has numerous well-established effects on behavior. For instance, it has been 
shown that consumers selectively focus on information that bolsters their self-beliefs when their 
identity is threatened (Dunning et al. 1991; Wentura and Greve 2005), that they also choose 
products that support their self-concept (Gao et al. 2009), and, finally, that they become more 
motivated to firmly advocate their threatened self-beliefs (Gal and Rucker 2010). Because 
referral failure implicitly questions consumers’ abilities to make adequate consumer decisions, 
any such failure will subsequently activate the goal to restore this self-belief. Building on self-
determination theory (Deci and Ryan 1985), we argue that reducing reliance on external 
information during decision-making can restore this self-belief. Self-determination theory (Deci 
and Ryan 1985) distinguishes between several motivational states, two of which are relevant for 
our argument. First, a behavior is controlled when others partially control one’s intentional 
behavior (e.g., when someone buys a product because a salesman is pushy or because he or she 
hopes it will make them blend in with a reference group). In this state, the actor is subject to 
external influences. In contrast, a behavior is self-determined when it reflects the self’s true 
preferences and autonomous decisions (e.g., when someone works hard because they like the 
work or when a consumer chooses based on her own needs). Only in this latter case can 
decisions be considered unbiased reflections of the self and relevant for one’s self view and, 
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therefore, true choices (Deci and Ryan 1987). Based on this distinction found in self-
determination theory, we suggest that restoring one’s self-concept can be achieved only when 
decisions are made autonomously and not when one’s decision is (partly) the result of external 
influence, as is the case in controlled behavior.  
We therefore expect that a goal to restore one’s self-concept as a competent decision 
maker will lead to a decreased likelihood of complying with external influence. Indeed, existing 
research mentions that noncompliance is used to defend important self-views (Nail et al. 2000). 
People even strategically reduce compliance to signal their identity to others (Berger and Heath 
2007) or shape it for themselves (Blanton and Christie 2003).  As a result, we propose that 
referral failure motivates consumers to discard external influence during their decision-making. 
We predict that 
H1: Referral failure reduces the referrer’s likelihood to comply with external influence when 
making decisions. 
The theoretical model we put forward implies that this hypothesized referral backfire 
effect (i.e., H1) may be explained by the identity threatening nature of referral failure. Prior 
research showed that identity threat leads to higher motivation to bolster the self. For example, 
upon perceiving an identity threat, people show a greater liking for people whose participant 
number resembles their birthdays (Jones et al. 2004), take up more space when putting their 
signature (Rudman et al. 2007), and increase their liking for brands and words resembling their 
own name (Brendl et al. 2005; Jones et al. 2002). We will measure the motivation to bolster the 
self via an implicit egotism measure (Buhrmester, Blanton, and Swann 2011; Jones et al. 2002). 
If referral failure is threatening to the self, it should invoke the motivation to bolster the self, 
which leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Referral failure increases implicit egotism. 
To further investigate the proposed process driving the referral backfire effect, we turn to 
moderation designs. We will select two distinct factors that are believed to have an attenuating 
impact on identity threat: first, we focus on consumer knowledge concerning the specific 
product domain of the referral, and further below, we discuss the moderating role of general 
self-affirmation. Existing literature indicates that the level of knowledge about a topic is related 
to the centrality of that topic to the self (Belk 1988; Sprott, Czellar, and Spangenberg 2009). 
When applied to referrals, this relationship means that the centrality of the referral outcome to 
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the referrer’s identity correlates with the referrer’s level of knowledge in this domain. 
Furthermore, the personal importance of a specific domain has been shown to affect the level of 
self-threat (Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent 1995; Sherman and Cohen 2006). For instance, a 
report describing the link between caffeine use and fibrocystic disease triggers defensive 
mechanisms only for heavy caffeine consumers for whom the topic is of greater importance 
(Liberman and Chaiken 1992). This result indicates that referral failure can occur without 
identity threat, as long as the referral was made in a domain that is not central to one’s identity. 
We use knowledge of the domain of referral as a proxy for this centrality. Accordingly, we 
expect that: 
H3: The referral backfire effect is stronger for consumers who perceive themselves as more 
knowledgeable about the product domain than for consumers who do not. 
Additionally, self-affirmation theory proposes that people can respond to threats by 
affirming alternative self-resources unrelated to the identity threat. This “self-affirmation” can be 
achieved when people reflect on important aspects of their life or engage in an activity that 
highlights important values, which causes participants to realize that their own self-worth does 
not depend solely on the aspect of their identity that is threatened and thereby reduces the need 
for self-bolstering (Sherman and Cohen 2006).  
Accordingly, manipulations of self-affirmation (Steele 1988) have been used successfully 
to reduce various effects of potential identity threats in different domains (Fein and Spencer 
1997; Sherman et al. 2000; Steele and Liu 1983). If referral failure leads to avoiding external 
input because it increases the need to bolster the self-concept, external support for the self 
should satisfy this need and thereby attenuate the referral backfire effect. Therefore, we propose 
that: 
H4: Self-affirmation will attenuate the referral backfire effect. 
PREFACE TO THE PRESENT STUDIES 
The present studies induce referral failure by means of scenario studies or real decision 
contexts and measure their effects on subsequent decision-making. In particular, the studies 
examine the extent to which consumers incorporate external advice in their decisions. In study 
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1, we demonstrate the referral backfire effect, showing that the awareness that others have not 
followed the participant’s advice reduces his or her willingness to incorporate unrelated 
consumer reviews in decision making. In studies 2-4, we replicate this effect via different 
procedures and further elaborate the role played by identity threat in the referral backfire effect. 
In study 2, we show that referral failure is self-threatening. In study 3, evidence is provided that 
this effect of referral failure is attenuated for consumers with low levels of knowledge in the 
domain of referral. Study 4 shows that the referral backfire effect is also attenuated when the 
need for self-bolstering is alleviated by an external manipulation of self-affirmation subsequent to 
referral failure. Thus, studies 3 and 4 illustrate important boundary conditions of the effect: the 
referral backfire effect only occurs when referral failure is identity-threatening. Furthermore, 
study 3 shows that the referral backfire effect is independent of the match between domain of 
the referral and domain of the subsequent product decision.  
STUDY 1 
We had two aims with this study. First, we wanted to show a relation between referral 
outcome and subsequent compliance with external influence (H1). After manipulating the 
referral outcome in a first scenario, we measured susceptibility to persuasion by a third party in a 
second, seemingly unrelated task. Second, we expected that referral failure influences 
subsequent decision making, whereas referral success does not because consumers nourish 
positively biased self-concepts: positive feedback regarding one’s self-concept is smoothly 
incorporated and does not receive considerable attention (Dawson, Gilovich, and Regan 2002; 
Dunning 2007; Jain and Maheswaran 2000). Therefore, we added a control condition in which 
no referral was made. We did not expect referral success to influence any dependent measure. 
 METHOD 
One hundred fifty individuals (50 male and 100 female), aged between 18 and 30 
participated in this experiment in exchange for a participation fee.  
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Manipulation of Referral Outcome 
In a first phase, we manipulated referral outcome by means of a scenario. Participants 
were asked to imagine the following: 
“You are the son/daughter of the manager of a small movie theater in your town. This gives 
you the chance to watch all movies for free and before all the others. Your friends are aware of 
this and they frequently ask you which movies are worthwhile to see. After a while, you notice 
that your advice is often or always [seldom or never] followed; they prefer the movies you liked 
[you did not like].”  
In the control condition, participants received a neutral filler task of similar length.  
Measurement of compliance with external influences 
We adapted a procedure used in Fitzsimons and Lehmann (2004), telling participants that 
researchers of a food manufacturer were developing a new granola bar, and they were interested 
in consumer impressions. Subsequently, participants received the descriptions of four potential 
granola bar formulations with two different attributes: Taste and calories. Attribute values for 
each of the four formulations for taste (1: poor taste, 10: excellent taste) and number of calories 
were, respectively: A: 7.5, 125; B: 8, 365; C: 9, 220; D: 6, 150. Formulations A and C are 
relatively attractive, while formulations B and D are relatively less attractive (Fitzsimons and 
Lehmann 2004). Next, participants received reports from an expert magazine (e-health) that 
strongly recommended either granola bar A or C (counterbalanced between participants). After 
receiving this advice, participants were asked to indicate which of 20 different combinations of 
three granola bars they would prefer when given the chance to choose three bars (e.g., “A:1, 
B:1, C:1, D:0”; “A:2, B:1, C:0, D:0”; “A:0, B:0, C:3, D:0”, … Fitzsimons and Lehmann, 
2004). Participants could either incorporate this external advice and choose the recommended 
option or ignore the external advice by selecting bars that were not recommended.   
Results and Discussion 
To test whether referral outcome (success, failure, control) had an influence on a 
participant’s compliance with external influence on his or her choice, we performed an ANOVA 
with choice of recommended granola bars (0-3, log-transformed) as the dependent variable and 
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the Referral Outcome manipulation as the independent variable. The main effect of the Referral 
Outcome manipulation was significant (F(2, 148) = 4.79, p <.01). The choice of recommended 
granola bars was lower in the referral failure condition (M =.28, SE =.025) than in either the 
referral success (M =.36, SE =.025) (t(148) = 2.14, p <.05) or the control conditions (M =.38, 
SE =.019) (t(148) = 3.10, p <.005). The difference between the latter two conditions was 
insignificant (t(148) =.67, ns.).  
These results imply that experiencing referral failure leads to lower compliance with 
external influences in a subsequent choice compared to referral success or no referral experience 
at all. Additionally, the referral success condition did not differ from the control condition 
without a referral.  
STUDY 2 
In the second study, we wanted to replicate our findings with actual behavior. Moreover, 
we wanted to test our inference that referral failure is threatening to the self. When referral 
failure occurred, we expected that a need to bolster the self against this threat would arise. 
Consequently and in accordance with existing literature about self-threat, we predicted an 
increased attachment to anything that is self-relevant after referral failure. Therefore, the aim of 
this second study is twofold: to test whether referral failure leads to increased implicit egotism 
(H2) and to replicate the referral backfire effect with a different procedure as in study 1. 
Method 
One hundred sixty seven individuals (84 male and 83 female), aged between 18 and 25, 
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit.  
Participants were told that the experiment was a test case for a larger project that 
investigated the viability of a communication network between two consumer labs via the 
Internet. Participants were further told that the research concerned the fluency of e-
communication when participants saw each other’s picture. To further this cover story, 
participants took a picture using a web camera. In reality, there was no interaction partner, and 
the alleged interaction partner’s behavior was preprogrammed. For the remainder of the 
- 52 - 
 
description of this study, we use participant to refer to the actual person participating in the 
experiment and interaction partner for the fictitious, preprogrammed person in the other lab. 
The actual experiment consisted of two phases. In each phase, participants were 
connected to a different interaction partner. The gender of the interaction partner was 
counterbalanced between the phases and participant gender to neutralize order and gender 
effects. In each round, participants were asked to choose six product items (a cell phone, 
backpack, toothbrush, laptop, ballpoint pen and yogurt), which had to be selected from sets of 
three options. All 18 products were displayed as a picture.  Participants were told that to 
structure the decision, they would be randomly assigned to either an adviser role – in which they 
could indicate their preference first – or a decider role – in which they had to make the final 
choice (for themselves, not for the interaction partner) after the adviser indicated his preference. 
The participants were further informed that they would be teamed up with a different 
interaction partner and switch roles in the second round. In reality, all participants were 
assigned the role of adviser in the first round, during which a manipulation of referral success 
took place. In the second round, the participants were all assigned to the role of decider, which 
allowed us to assess the referral backfire effect. In between rounds, we gave every participant 
the impression that the new interaction partner was not ready yet, and we asked them to 
complete some filler questions and a poll about which name to choose for the new computer 
system, which actually included the implicit egotism measure. 
Manipulation of Referral Outcome (phase 1) 
In the control condition, the interaction partner followed the participant’s choice 5 out of 
6 times. In the Referral Failure condition, the interaction partner followed the participant’s 
choice only 1 out of 6 times. The gender of the interaction partner was counterbalanced across 
conditions and participant gender to neutralize gender effects.  
Implicit Egotism measure 
Between phases, we told participants that we still needed to decide on a name for the new 
software system. The participants were allowed to indicate by means of a 20-point slider 
between two possible names how much they preferred one option to another. Importantly, one 
of the two options was manipulated such that the first three letters of the name for the program 
were the same as those of the first name of the participant. The suffix of those three letters (“-
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ano”) and the comparison name (“Valdamo”) were kept constant. Threats to the self should cause 
a higher preference for the name with the same first letters as the participant’s own first name 
(Jones et al. 2002). Measuring this preference thus allows us to test whether referral outcome 
affects implicit egotism. 
The referral backfire effect 
In the second phase, the interaction partner always gave the advice to choose the least 
attractive product out of the three (determined from pre-testing with 46 participants). We 
measured referral backfire by the number of times (0-6) the participant did not follow the 
interaction partner’s advice. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Two effects were found for participants whose advice was not followed. First, we 
replicated the referral backfire effect found in study 1. Upon referral failure, participants were 
less likely to follow the advice of the interaction partner (M = 2.35, SE =.093) than in the 
control condition (M = 2.68, SE =.11) (t(165) = 2.28, p <.05). 
Second, participants in the referral failure condition showed more implicit egotism: they 
preferred the name based on their own name to the control name (M = 10.84, SE =.72) at a 
higher rate than participants whose advice had previously been followed (M = 8.32, SE =.70) 
(t(165) = 2.51, p <.05).  Additionally, we found these two dependent measures to be 
significantly correlated (r=-.18, p <.05), further cross-validating the referral backfire effect as 
an instance of self-bolstering.  We found no effects stemming from participant gender, 
interaction-partner gender, or any interaction effect between these factors and our manipulation 
in an ANOVA (all F’s < 1.5).  
The findings of this study provide support for hypothesis 2 that referral failure leads to an 
increase in implicit egotism, thereby providing empirical evidence for the idea that referral 
failure is threatening to the self. Moreover, we replicated the findings of study 1 by showing that 
referral failure leads to more self-determined behavior. In combination, these results support 
our inference that the referral backfire effect should be understood as an instance of self-
bolstering in reaction to the identity threatening nature of referral failure. In study 3, we aim to 
provide further evidence for the role of identity threat in the referral backfire effect by testing 
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whether the effect is attenuated for consumers with low knowledge levels in the domain of 
referral. 
STUDY 3 
In this study, we wanted to replicate and combine our previous results and aimed for two 
additional contributions. First, we wanted to provide process evidence by showing that the 
referral backfire effect is suppressed when referral failure does not provide an identity threat. In 
agreement with existing literature that relates knowledge levels in a domain to centrality in 
consumers’ self-concepts (Sprott et al. 2009), we used self-perceived knowledge levels in the 
domain of referral (e.g., movies) as a proxy of the threatening nature of referral failure.  We 
expected that if the sender were unknowledgeable about the domain of the referral, then 
referral failure would threaten the sender’s identity less and therefore reduce the referral 
backfire effect compared to when the sender is knowledgeable in the domain of referral. This 
study effectively provides an important boundary condition for the referral backfire effect.  
The second aim of this study is to show that the referral backfire effect is not dependent 
on the match between the domain of referral and the domain of the subsequent product 
decision, which agrees with the self-affirmation literature that predicts non-threat specific effects 
of identity threat. In the previous two studies, we focused on the effect of referral failure on 
product decisions outside of the domain (across domain compensation). However, because there 
is no theoretical reason to expect moderation by domain match, this third study includes data 
from both within and across domain DVs.  
METHOD 
One hundred thirty-seven individuals (57 male and 80 female), aged between 18 and 29, 
participated in this experiment in exchange for a participation fee. For this study, restaurants and 
movies were used as both the domains of referral and domains within which an external 
influence was provided. A scenario similar to the one used in study 1 manipulated referral 
outcome in an initial domain (either movies or restaurants), after which popularity information 
for items within and outside of this initial domain was given (for both movies and restaurants). 
This popularity information was based on the preferences of a large group of consumers and can 
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be considered a subtle type of social influence (Nail et al. 2000). Therefore, we obtain two 
measures of compliance with external influence – one within a domain (e.g., preferences for the 
most popular movie after recommending movies), and one across a different domain (e.g., 
preferences for the most popular restaurant after recommending movies).  
Manipulation of Referral Outcome 
This study used a scenario similar to the one employed in study 1. Importantly, in 
addition to manipulating the referral outcome between participants, we also manipulated the 
domain of referral to be either restaurants or movies. This factor was manipulated between 
participants and counterbalanced across referral outcome conditions. First, we asked participants 
to think of an acquaintance and to imagine this person asking them – occasionally – for advice 
about restaurants [movies]. We then presented participants with a list of six restaurants [movies] 
and asked them to recommend one. Next, we presented the remainder of this scenario, 
containing the referral failure manipulation (between participants): 
“One week after recommending this restaurant, you coincidentally meet your acquaintance at the 
doorstep of the restaurant you recommended [a different restaurant than the one you recommended]. From 
the small conversation that follows, it turns out that this is not a coincidence: your acquaintance had indeed 
chosen to follow up [not follow up] on your referral.” 
We asked participants to imagine this in a vivid way, after which they answered several 
filler questions meant to provide a rationale for this scenario. A similar text was used in the 
movie condition. 
Measurement of referral backfire 
In the measurement phase, participants were provided with lists of both restaurants and 
movies used in the recommendation phase and were asked to rank order them according to 
personal preference. Crucially, prior to ranking, they were given popularity information as a 
source of external influence. The participants were told that one restaurant and one movie had 
been chosen as best by panels of visitors on relevant review websites. This approach allowed us 
to test their compliance with this external influence by looking at the extent to which these most 
popular items were ranked highly. Because participants had made a recommendation in one of 
these two domains before, this resulted in two DVs, which allowed us to test the referral 
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backfire effect both within and across domain (e.g., a participant who recommended a movie in 
phase one and ranks both movies and restaurants in phase two provides a within domain measure 
for movies and an across domain measure for restaurants). Measurement of these two DVs was 
counterbalanced for order between conditions. Importantly, because of the rank ordering task, a 
higher number indicates a weaker attitude towards an item, implying lower compliance with the 
external influence. Therefore, a higher number implies a stronger backfire effect. 
Knowledgeability 
Additionally, we asked participants to indicate to what extent they knew about the items 
of each set they had been asked to rank order in the measurement phase. A single item scale, 
which we will further refer to as “knowledgeability,” between “not at all” (-5) and “very well” 
(5) was used to measure this (Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007; Mobley, Bearden, and Teel 1988). 
For the analysis of knowledgeability, it is important to understand that this measure is matched 
with participants’ domain of referral: participants that had recommended a restaurant [movie] in 
the referral phase, rated their own knowledgeability about the restaurants [movies] presented. 
Results and discussion 
We investigated whether the main effect of referral failure on subsequent compliance with 
external influence depended on the knowledgeability of the domain of referral (as a potential 
moderator of the threatening nature of referral failure) or match with the domain of referral 
failure (i.e., within or across domain evaluation of items). We conducted a linear mixed model 
with referral outcome as a between participants categorical independent variable, domain 
knowledgeability as a continuous independent measure, and domain match (i.e., the rank of the 
externally recommended item within domain and rank of the externally recommended item 
across domain) as within-participants dependent measures1. We focus on three aspects of the 
                                                      
1 Ranks are not on an interval scale. We conducted a generalized mixed model with ordinal probit 
dependent variables, which led to the same conclusions: the main effect of referral outcome was significant (Wald 
χ² (1) = 9.00, p < .005), as was the two-way interaction between knowledgeability and referral outcome (Wald χ² 
(1) = 4.91, p < .05). Again, a three-way interaction was absent (Wald χ² (1) = .24, ns). We preferred the 
parametric analysis because of its greater flexibility in testing contrasts and spotlight analyses and because the 
violations are typically inconsequential (Velleman and Wilkinson 1993) Velleman, Paul F. and Leland Wilkinson (1993), "Nominal, Ordinal, Interval, and Ratio Typologies Are Misleading," The American Statistician, 47 (1), 65-72. 
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results: the main effect of referral outcome (F(1,133) = 12,02, p <.005), which replicates the 
referral backfire effect; the two-way interaction between knowledgeability and referral outcome 
(F(1,133) = 5.08, p <.05), which tests the attenuating role of low knowledgeability on the 
referral backfire effect; and the absence of the three-way interaction, (F(1,133) = 0.38, ns.), 
which shows that the referral backfire effect is insensitive to domain match.  
To elaborate on the main effect of referral outcome on rank across and within domain, we 
conducted contrast tests. First, we found a significant effect of referral outcome on ranking 
across domain: after referral failure, participants ranked the recommended item lower (M = 
3.39, SE =.19) than after referral success (M = 2.84, SE =.19; t(136) = -2.07, p <.05), which 
replicates the referral backfire effect found in studies 1 and 2. Second, a similar significant effect 
occurred within a domain: after referral failure, participants ranked the recommended item 
lower (M = 2.99, SE =.18) than after referral success (M = 2.37, SE =.18; t(136) = -2.45, p 
<.05).  
To examine in more detail the two-way interaction between knowledgeability and referral 
outcome (see Figure 6), we conducted a spotlight analysis (Fitzsimons 2008; Irwin and 
McClelland 2001). At one standard deviation below the mean of knowledgeability, no significant 
difference appeared in the ranking of the externally recommended item between participants in 
the referral success condition and those in the referral failure condition (Msuccess = 2.54 and Mfailure 
= 2.74, respectively; β =.10, SE =.12, t =.84, ns). As hypothesized, low knowledgeability 
regarding the domain of referral attenuates the referral backfire effect. Interestingly, however, 
the referral backfire effect occurred at the mean level of knowledgeability (Msuccess = 2.61, Mfailure 
= 3.19, β =.29, SE =.084, t = 3.47, p <.001) and at a high level (one standard deviation above 
the mean) of knowledgeability (Msuccess = 2.68, Mfailure = 3.64, β =.48, SE =.12, t = 4.05, p 
<.001).  
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Figure 6: Effect of referral outcome x knowledgeability on rank of recommended item 
 
For the sake of completeness, the mixed model also showed a positive (r =.248) main 
effect of knowledgeability (F(1,133) = 9.69, p <.005 ), i.e., knowledgeability generally leads to 
a lower ranking of the recommended item. Additionally, and unrelated to the full model 
analyzed above, we found that participants were less knowledgeable about local restaurants (M = 
-1.88, SE =.25) than movies (M = 1.48, SE =.23; t(136) = -10.50, p <.001).  
In previous studies, we took measures to avoid potential alternative explanations that 
explained the referral backfire effect in ways other than the identity threatening nature of 
referral failure. These measures largely consisted of separating the phase where referral failure 
takes place as much as possible from the phase where external information is incorporated into a 
decision or not. Failing to do this could lead to a game of “tit for tat”, where participants ignore 
advice because theirs was also ignored. This failure could also lead to an alternative explanation 
in terms of experimental demand. On a more conceptual level, one could also argue that 
experiencing referral failure induces a social norm of independence. All of these arguments 
make predictions similar to the referral backfire effect. However, these arguments do not 
account for the moderation of this effect by knowledgeability.  Thus, this study not only 
provides further support for our hypotheses, it also rules out these potential alternative 
explanations.  
Furthermore, this study provides several preliminary insights into the nature of the threat 
from referral failure. Because the effect is not observed under low knowledgeability, it is clear 
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that referral failure does not call into question the relationship between sender and receiver nor 
the sender’s power to influence others. These two explanations would not be eliminated under 
low knowledgeability. Referral failure threatens the self-image at the level of competence in 
decision-making in the domain of referral. 
STUDY 4 
In study 4, we aimed to provide further evidence for self-bolstering as the underlying 
mechanism for the referral backfire effect. This study again uses a moderation design. The 
current study aims to eliminate the threat to self-identity after referral failure and before the 
subsequent decision. This study design is in contrast to study 3, which prevented the threat 
altogether. If the referral backfire effect relies on a need to resolve identity-threat, the effect of 
referral failure should be attenuated when an alternative way to bolster the ego is provided. We 
asked participants to evaluate the helpfulness of reviews for a product in an online store. Based 
on existing literature (Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Nail et al. 2000), we use these reviews as 
sources of influence. This approach is in line with the finding that consumers rely heavily on the 
opinion of others when making consumer decisions (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006). In accordance 
with previous results, we expected these evaluations of helpfulness to decrease after referral 
failure, as participants would be more inclined to rely on their own preferences to make choices 
and discard external information. However, in accordance with H4, we expected this effect to 
disappear when the self-threat comprised by referral failure had been compensated for by a self-
bolstering, positive experience.  
METHOD 
Ninety-three individuals (62 male and 31 female), aged between 19 and 28 years, 
participated in this experiment in exchange for a participation fee. Participants came to the lab 
for a one-hour session that included several studies, of which this study was first. Four 
participants reported extreme evaluations of the reviews and were removed as outliers based on 
the 3SD criterion (3%).  
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Manipulation of Referral Outcome 
Participants were asked to choose their favorite out of six movie posters. In the control 
condition, the participants were told that the study concerned what factors people take into 
account when making this sort of choice and were asked to write a short justification for why 
they chose that particular poster. Participants in the referral failure condition were asked to 
write the same justification but were also told that their arguments would be shown to another 
participant (called the reviewing participant, which was preprogrammed). The actual 
participants were told the reviewing participant would indicate the degree to which he or she 
considered switching their favorite poster to the favorite poster of the participant after reading 
the justification. For this condition, no information about the identity of the reviewing 
participant was revealed. After writing and submitting their justification, participants in both 
conditions saw the favorite poster and the argument of a third, different preprogrammed 
participant, who justified his choice for a randomly picked poster by means of generic 
arguments. For example, one such argument was that the poster represented the movie 
accurately. At that point, participants were asked to indicate how likely they were to change 
their opinion on a 7-point scale (1: “certainly not” to 7: “certainly”).  Because participants in the 
referral failure condition had not received feedback on their own preferences yet, this likelihood 
did not serve as a dependent variable but was rather a part of the procedure aimed at making the 
advice phase believable. We found no correlation between this switching likelihood, and 
subsequent measures (all F’s < 1). Afterwards, participants in the referral failure condition 
always received a response from the (preprogrammed) reviewing participant that he would be 
“very unlikely” (2 out of 7) to switch to the participant’s choice after having read the 
participant’s argumentation. Participants in the control condition did not receive any such 
feedback. Afterwards, all participants were told that this task was completed and were asked to 
start the next task. 
Self-Affirmation Manipulation 
After the first phase of the experiment, participants were asked to perform a writing task 
that seemed to be completely unrelated but included the self-affirming manipulation. We 
adopted a procedure frequently used in previous research (Fein and Spencer 1997; Sherman et 
al. 2000). Participants were asked to rank a list of 11 values and personal characteristics (e.g., 
physical attractiveness, being a good friend, financial success) in order of personal importance. In 
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the self-affirmation condition, the participants wrote a brief essay explaining why their top-
ranked value was important to them and described a time in their lives when this value had been 
particularly useful. In the no-affirmation condition, participants wrote about why and when the 
value they had ranked seventh in importance could be of importance to the average college 
student.  
Measurement of referral backfire 
In this study, participants rated the helpfulness of online evaluations in a way similar to 
what actually takes place in such online stores as Amazon.com. Participants indicated the 
helpfulness of negative and positive comments made about a product that – at the time of this 
study – was little known among our participants (i.e., the Amazon kindle) by awarding 1 to 5 
stars for each specific comment. Consumer reviews should be considered less helpful when 
participants are less willing to comply with external influence.  
Results and Discussion 
A 2 (referral outcome) by 2 (self-affirmation) dimensional design showed that referral 
outcome had a significant main effect on the perceived helpfulness of consumer reviews: referral 
failure (M = 3.45, SE =.25) led to a lower perceived helpfulness than the control condition (M 
= 4.14, SE =.24; F(1,85) = 4.03, p <.05). Importantly, this effect was qualified by a significant 
interaction effect between referral outcome and the self-affirmation manipulation (F(1,85) = 
6.78, p <.05). As depicted in Figure 7, only participants in the no-affirmation condition rated 
the consumer reviews as less helpful when having encountered referral failure (M = 2.77, SE 
=.34) compared to the control condition (M = 4.35, SE =.39; t(85) = 3.07, p <.005). No 
referral backfire effect was observed in the self-affirmation condition (M = 4.13, SE =.33 in the 
referral failure condition vs. M = 3.93, SE =.31 in the control condition; t(85) = -.45, ns.). 
Additionally, participants in the referral failure condition rated the consumer reviews as more 
helpful after self-affirmation (M = 4.13, SE =.33) compared to the no-affirmation condition (M 
= 2.77, SE =.34; t(85) = 2.85, p <.01). In the control condition, self-affirmation had no effect 
on perceived helpfulness when comparing the neutral task condition (M = 4.35, SE =.39) with 
the self-affirmation condition (M = 3.93, SE =.31; t(85) =.86, ns.). 
- 62 - 
 
 
Figure 7: Effect of referral outcome x self-affirmation on perceived helpfulness of product 
reviews 
 
Study 4 conceptually replicated the referral backfire effect with a different procedure, 
thereby providing additional evidence for the process causing the effect. Moreover, study 4 
supported H4: that self-affirming information attenuates the effect of referral failure on the 
evaluations of consumer reviews.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Addressing the effect of referral outcome on the person making the referral is of growing 
importance because consumers engage in referral behavior on a daily basis and are even 
stimulated by companies to do so (Ryu and Feick 2007; Schmitt et al. 2011). Making a referral is 
often driven by the motivation to maintain and enhance a positive self-concept (Hennig-Thurau 
et al. 2004). Moreover, engaging in a referral makes a consumer’s choices, and therefore her 
identity, notably visible. This publicity is even more relevant in the online environment. 
Referral failure can thus not only bring into question a consumer’s choices but also the view of 
oneself as a capable choice maker. We reasoned that consumers are motivated to re-establish this 
self-image by making choices that are a direct reflection of one’s capability as a decision maker. 
Based on self-determination theory, this motivation implies a relative shift from controlled to 
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self-determined behavior (Deci and Ryan 1985), which we predicted would make consumers 
less likely to comply with external sources of influence. That reduced compliance can be used to 
bolster the self is in line with existing literature (Blanton and Christie 2003; Nail et al. 2000).  
Four studies showed that referral failure indeed reduces the referrer’s likelihood to comply with 
external influence in subsequent choices. Furthermore, based on the idea that referral failure is 
identity-threatening, we provided process evidence and boundary conditions for this referral 
backfire effect. Implicit egotism (reflecting a need to bolster the self) is increased after referral 
failure (study 2). Furthermore, the referral backfire effect is attenuated when the referral topic 
is not central to the identity of the referrer (study 3) and is eliminated when the threat is 
compensated by self-affirmation (study 4). In addition, the referral backfire effect is independent 
of the match between referral domain and the domain of the subsequent product decision (study 
3). Throughout our studies, we rule out several potential alternative explanations for the 
referral backfire effect. Moreover, the results of study 3 allow us to make inferences concerning 
the nature of the threat of referral failure. Because our findings show that the referral backfire 
effect is attenuated in participants with low self-perceived knowledgeability in the domain of 
referral, we can conclude that what is under threat is not the relationship between the sender 
and receiver of information, nor the sender’s power to influence others. Rather, referral failure 
threatens the idea that consumers have of themselves as competent decision makers in the 
domain of referral. In combination, these studies suggest that referral failure poses a threat to 
consumers’ identity, which leads them to discard external influence in an attempt to restore 
their self-images as competent in making consumer choices.  
Theoretical and managerial implications 
We believe that our findings extend previous research in several important ways. First, to 
the best of our knowledge, we are the first researchers to acknowledge that the outcome of 
giving advice to others might be consequential to the sender of advice, which is a finding that has 
implications in many research domains other than marketing. Although several authors have 
identified the motivations involved in giving advice (Dichter 1966; Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004; 
Sundaram et al. 1998), no research has investigated what happens when the needs behind those 
motivations are not met. Whereas dominant models of information diffusion often model 
referral behavior (e.g., literature using the Bass diffusion model – Bass 1969), they do not seem 
to assume feedback loops involving the referrers based on referral outcomes. Our results 
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demonstrate the importance of considering the potential effects of the referral outcome on the 
referrer. These effects are particularly important in models of information diffusion or 
communication models in general. Second, we provide evidence that the outcome of a referral 
can be identity-threatening. Accordingly, we can expect many other behavioral effects because 
the existing literature indicates that self-affirmation in general can be used to cope with identity 
threats (Steele 1988).  For instance, it has been shown that identity threat leads to 
“compensatory” consumption of status goods (Sivanathan and Pettit 2010). Therefore, senders 
who incur a referral failure may be subsequently more interested in offers that promise to 
bolster the self, such as compensatory status consumption or consumption in other unrelated 
domains, as long as this consumption helps protect against or compensate for the identity threat. 
Third, while previous consumer literature has identified reactions to identity threat in terms of 
what consumer decisions are made (Gao et al. 2009), we show that threats can also lead to 
reactions in how decisions are made. Consumers comply less with external influences on their 
decision processes after experiencing a referral failure.  
Fourth, we arrived at our hypothesis about the nature of referral backfire based on a 
distinction made in the self-determination literature between controlled and self-determined 
behavior (Deci and Ryan 1985). Whereas this literature explicitly states that self-determined 
choices do not preclude complying with external influence, as long as one fully identifies with 
this influence (Chirkov et al. 2003; Ryan 1993), our results highlight a potential limitation to the 
independence of self-determination and compliance. If choice serves to establish competence in 
choice making and thereby restore a self-image, then external influences prohibit choices to be a 
valid proof of this competence. However, one could argue that behavior aimed at restoring a 
self-image after a threat is caused or controlled by this threat, and therefore such behavior is not 
actually self-determined behavior. Future research in this domain should determine whether and 
when self-bolstering is self-determined or controlled behavior. 
We also see important managerial implications of our findings. First, the potential effects 
of referral failure on subsequent behavior calls into question the much-heralded efficacy of 
WOM (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Reichheld 2003). Considering that consumers who make 
referrals are usually the company’s most satisfied customers (Anderson 1998), our results reveal 
the undesirable possibility that an ill-considered campaign that stimulates WOM might induce 
unintended behavioral changes in exactly those most valuable customers. It is difficult to predict 
a priori whether consumers’ discarding of external influence might make them abandon the 
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product because of referral failure or cling to the product even more vigorously. Theoretically, 
both reactions are possible, and further research could find circumstances under which either 
condition prevails. However, customer development efforts, such as up-selling or cross-selling, 
are likely to be compromised in customers less willing to comply with external influences due to 
prior referral failure. Such attempts at persuasion might be particularly ineffective if they are not 
somehow framed as a support for an initial choice made by the customer. In other words, a good 
WOM campaign is more complicated than merely increasing the Net Promoter Score 
(Reichheld 2003). To arrive at a more complete view of behavioral changes associated with 
stimulating word of mouth, a good WOM campaign should also consider the likelihood of 
referral failure and estimate its impact. We may therefore additionally recommend monitoring 
not only referral success in referral reward programs (Ryu and Feick 2007; Schmitt et al. 2011) 
but also referral failure. This approach is potentially even more important because referral 
failure might – as previously mentioned– affect the company’s best customers. Interestingly, our 
findings not only reveal potential risks in the current practice of stimulating consumer referral, 
they also offer methods of addressing consumers facing referral failure. More specifically, self-
affirmation in an unrelated domain can compensate for the identity threat caused by referral 
failure (study 4). Indeed, highlighting a customer’s value to the company, their contribution or 
significance in general (e.g., by offering them rewards for loyalty) or affirming his or her lifestyle 
aspects relevant to the company’s offer (e.g., a perfume brand promoting a luxurious lifestyle) 
might be exactly the type of self-affirmation such a customer needs.   
A final practical observation is that stimulating referrals is often mentioned as the solution 
to the declining effectiveness of traditional advertising methods (Kumar 2010; Van den Bulte 
and Wuyts 2009). Ironically, referral failures might contribute to that very decline because 
consumers facing referral failure might be impelled to make their own decisions and discard 
external information in the form of marketing messages.  
Suggestions for future research 
Our studies constitute a first step in answering the question of how referral outcome 
affects consumer behavior. Nevertheless, our research also evokes several questions for future 
enquiry. Most of those questions are based on our main contribution: referral outcome may be 
consequential for the referrer. However, it is essential that additional boundary conditions and 
both theoretical and practical implications be investigated. First, in our studies, the referrer is 
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always aware of the failure of his/her referral. It might be an interesting avenue for future 
research to find out not only (a) when consumers notice referral failure but also (b) when they 
experience it as a failure. Second, in our studies, participants made recommendations to others 
that were moderately distant to them (fellow students). Research shows that recommendations 
travel through weak ties, where they have a bridging function, and through strong ties, where 
they are most influential (Brown and Reingen 1987). Future research could focus on the 
moderating effect of the strength of these ties on the referral backfire effect. On the one hand, 
one may argue that strong ties buffer against referral failure because they are usually the result of 
rich and diverse relationships. Consequentially, referral failure would not necessarily lead to 
self-threats when the receiver and the referrer have strong ties. On the other hand, strong ties 
are characterized by a high degree of association, which could lead to an assumption of 
similarity. In that case, referral failure could violate that assumption and therefore cause even 
stronger effects in strong ties. Third, although our findings in study 3 already suggest that the 
threat invoked by referral failure is on the level of specific consumer decisions or decision 
making capability, future research could also provide more detailed insights into the nature of 
the threat of referral failure. A priori, referral failure could call into question one’s personality at 
large, the relationship between receiver and referrer, one’s consumer choices, one’s decision 
capability, one’s capability as an advisor, or other identity aspects. Additionally, the 
circumstances under which a referral occurs could affect different identity aspects, leading to 
varying effects of referral failure. Making a referral to a close friend or an unknown audience on 
the internet, as an established expert or as a lay person, after lengthy research or off the top of 
one’s head: all of these different conditions could lead to different inferences concerning the 
significance of referral failure for one’s identity, with different possible behavioral patterns 
accordingly.    
Fourth, it remains an empirical question whether consumers are on a certain level aware 
of the potential negative consequences of making a referral and whether they take this risk into 
consideration when deciding to make a referral. If this awareness is the case, it should bias these 
decisions toward more “safe” instances of referrals. Referrals would subsequently become more 
likely for brands with a high-perceived social support or under other circumstances that 
minimize the risk of referral failure. 
Finally, we identified in our introduction the need for self-presentation or self-
enhancement of identity as the core drivers behind referral behavior (De Angelis et al. 2011; 
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Hennig-Thurau et al. 2004). Because our data show that the self is indeed involved in referral 
behavior, this notion might offer insights into the behavior of key actors in the diffusion of 
information. The existing literature has identified Hubs (Goldenberg et al. 2009) and Market 
Mavens (Feick and Price 1987) as important actors in information proliferation. Because Hubs 
and Market Mavens share the attribute that they are active referrers, as well as avid information 
harvesters – and therefore very open to external influences – one might wonder how they 
accommodate referral failure. Does the centrality of being a Hub or Market Maven in these 
consumers’ self-identities and the ensuing desire to accumulate information override the threat 
of referral failure? Do they rely on sources of self-affirmation that are intrinsic to their role? If 
they do so, would these sources differ between types of key actors? Hubs, defined in terms of 
their social connectedness, may prefer to intensify the spreading of (other) information as a way 
to bolster their identity. Mavens may spread knowledge that is more technical and objective, 
which would be less open to opinion and therefore less discounted by referral outcomes. Further 
research might investigate how different key actors deal with the experience of referral failure 
because this knowledge might provide insight into the development of such Hubs and Mavens. 
In conclusion, we emphasize the need for more research into the effects of referral 
outcome on the referrer, especially in the large mass of ordinary consumers because the 
implications could be substantial for both consumer theory and the market place. 
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ESSAY 3: RISK COMPENSATION IN CONSUMER 
CHOICE 
 
Abstract 
Risk compensation theory proposes that people have an individual target level of risk that 
they try to maintain by counteracting situational influences that drive them away from this target 
level. Although a number of findings in consumer literature implicitly seem to rely on this 
principle, this theory itself is controversial and in need of more theoretical backing. Two 
different theoretical accounts – the theories of self-verification and optimal level of construal – 
both independently lead to the prediction of risk compensation. Building on their similarities, 
our results provide support for the existence of a target level of risk. Additionally, we find that 
risk compensation can occur outside of the situation where it was triggered, showing that the 
effect is not merely a direct reaction to the cue itself. These findings thus demonstrate some of 
the main features of risk compensation, thereby helping its theoretical advancement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A majority of consumers considers risk to be aversive (Weber and Hsee 1998). This 
aversion is driven by some of risk’s affectively negative components like dread towards the 
negative outcome, the lack of control, and uncertainty about the unknown (Peters and Slovic 
1996). Nevertheless, consumers often take risk to achieve a desired state. They do so often 
when purchasing a good or a service. Purchase risk can be thought of as physical, financial, 
social, psychological, performance, and overall risk, all potentially inhibiting purchase behavior 
(Jacoby and Kaplan 1972; Kaplan, Szybillo, and Jacoby 1974). Still, consumers overcome these 
inhibitory forces to purchase on a daily bases. This makes us wonder under what circumstances 
consumers are willing to assume risk. The theory of risk offsetting or risk compensation 
(Peltzman 1975) as well as risk homeostasis theory (Wilde 1982) predict that this would be the 
case when consumers feel excessively safe. These theories however, seem to be poorly 
embedded in more general risk-related literature, and predominantly based on descriptive data. 
In this manuscript we provide a new theoretical perspective on risk compensation and we 
present two experimental studies that, next to supporting this framework, also provide process 
evidence for the phenomenon of risk compensation. 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
On more than one occasion, consumers deliberately seek out risk (Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner 1992). Some consumers engage in thrill seeking through extreme sports (Breivik 
2010) or reckless car driving (Arnett, Offer, and Fine 1997). People sometimes make consumer 
choices that deliberately deviate from familiar and therefore less risky options, which is one of 
the drivers of variety seeking (McAlister and Pessemier 1982; Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman 
1999). Closely related, consumers sometimes just feel the desire to try something new and 
different, therefore inherently carrying a greater purchase risk (Hirschman 1980). Sometimes, 
the risk of a purchase even is a crucial driver of that purchase, for instance when one wants to 
show to be able to afford the financial (Griskevicius et al. 2007) or social risk of a choice (Millet 
and Dewitte 2007). In many of these situations it seems that situational drivers can influence the 
extent to which consumer are willing to assume risk, for instance variety seeking in response to 
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purchase quantity or display format of products (Simonson and Winer 1992), novelty seeking in 
response to a need for consumption knowledge (Clarkson, Janiszewski, and Cinelli 2013) or 
nonconformity in response to social influences (Ariely and Levav 2000). 
This raises the question whether a general mechanism exists that can explain momentary 
changes in consumers’ attitudes and behavior under risk. Risk homeostasis theory (RHT) 
provides such a framework, stating that people try to maintain a constant target level of risk, and 
that when security increases people adjust their behavior so that the resulting objective risk stays 
the same(Wilde 1982, 1998). Some of this theory’s  more extreme postulates (e.g. no external 
intervention can change the objective risk in a given situation), as well as some of its supporting 
conclusions about real life phenomena and literature (e.g. the number of car accidents stays the 
same, no matter the interventions to increase safety) lead to heavy criticism and general 
questioning of its validity (O'Neill and Williams 1998). A weaker version of this theory, the 
notion of risk compensation (Peltzman 1975) – without the claim that this compensation will 
keep risk at a constant level – found more empirical support. The occurrence of risk 
compensation has been shown with the introduction of anti-lock brakes in taxis, helmet-wearing 
cyclists, and seatbelt use – all of which were to a larger or lesser extent compensated by changes 
in behavior that counteracted these measures’ effectiveness in reducing risk (Aschenbrenner and 
Biehl 1994; Conybeare 1980; Johnson et al. 1978; Rodgers 1996). Risk compensation has also 
been demonstrated in consumer literature as a response to the existence of “remedies” for risk, 
for example in the case where for some groups, the availability of smoking cessation aids reduce 
the perceived risks of smoking, and actually seem to induce smoking behavior (Bolton et al. 
2006).  
It is striking how some consumer literature can be seen as implicit evidence for risk 
compensation, without explicitly building on this account. As an example, it has been shown 
that light physical touch can enhance feelings of security, leading to more risky financial decision 
making (Levav and Argo 2010). Furthermore, Hsee and Weber (1999) demonstrate the 
“cushion” hypothesis by showing that people are willing to take more financial risk when they are 
more certain of their social network. Still, some of the research explicitly supporting the 
account of risk compensation has been criticized as descriptive and methodologically flawed 
(Joksch 1976; Wilde 1986), or has even been demonstrated to be false (Robertson 1984). Even 
more importantly, our literature review on this topic found very little psychological process 
evidence for risk compensation. Notable exceptions to this observation are the previously 
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discussed work of Bolton et al. (2006), and the work of Jackson and Blackman (1994) in which 
the authors provide experimental evidence for risk compensation, and find in line with RHT that 
increasing the value of a motivational variable—accident cost—significantly reduces accident 
rate, whereas manipulation of two non-motivational variables—speed limit and speeding fine—
had no significant effect on accident rate. In spite of these results, many questions remain 
unanswered, for example about the nature and existence of a target level of risk in people, and 
the nature and purpose of compensation. Given the broad implications of this effect – also in 
consumer literature – this limited availability of process evidence is what we try to address in 
our research.  
For our theorizing, we first turn to literature about self-verification, the principle that 
people try to maintain consistent self-views (Swann 1983; Swann and Read 1981b; Swann et al. 
2003). Consequently, external interference in a person’s self-concept can lead to compensatory 
reactions in favor of restoring that self-view (Fein and Spencer 1997; Greve and Wentura 2003). 
People whose confidence in a personal quality is shaken by subtle manipulations like writing 
about this quality with their non-dominant hand, show greater preference for products 
compatible with this personal quality (Gao et al. 2009). Other research confirms that casting 
doubt over people’s self-concept can lead to compensatory behavior, like seeking out status 
goods to overcome personal failure (Sivanathan and Pettit 2010), or ignoring external decision 
cues to reestablish one’s trust in one’s own decision making capability (Claus et al. 2012). If 
people have a target level of acceptable risk like risk compensation literature proposes, it is likely 
that this level is a reflection of whether they see themselves rather as a prudent, careful person 
or rather as an exciting daredevil. Information incompatible with that self-view would then lead 
to a compensatory reaction in support of their self-concept.  
A second theoretical account for risk compensation, and especially for the existence of a 
target level of risk, might be found in literature discussing people’s optimal stimulation level 
(Berlyne 1960). The theory of Optimal Stimulation Level (OSL) proposes that people desire 
arousal up to a certain optimal level, above which it becomes aversive and stressful. OSL differs 
between individuals, and its conceptualization as well as its drivers and effects have been well 
documented (for a review, see Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1992). Much less empirical 
attention has been given to  the effects of deviations of the OSL (Steenkamp, Baumgartner, and 
Van der Wulp 1996). As risk is associated with arousal (Slovic 1964), this theory might explain 
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why externally induced risk-related deviations from this optimal level lead to compensatory risk-
taking behavior.  
The main aim of this research is to provide theoretical and process evidence for the theory 
of risk compensation. A crucial proposition in this theory is the existence of a target level of 
perceived risk that people try to maintain in any given situation. This theoretical construct is 
inferred from the observation that in many cases, interventions aimed at reducing the risk in a 
given situation do not yield the full effect they theoretically should have, because people adjust 
their behavior to (partially) compensate for this intervention. Without the premise of a target 
level of perceived risk, there would be no grounds to predict that people counteract 
interventions designed to reduce risk. While the existence of a target level of risk is based on a 
theoretical inference, the previously mentioned accounts of self-verification and OSL both 
provide some theoretical support for it. In comparing these two accounts, OSL is more founded 
in physiological processes, while self-verification refers to a cognitive process that is often 
conscious and deliberative (Fein and Spencer 1997; Greve and Wentura 2003). Prior research 
provides illustrations of compensatory risk preferences that seem more cognitive and 
deliberative in nature (Bolton et al. 2006; Hsee and Weber 1999), but also of those that seem 
more physiologically driven (Heino, van der Molen, and Wilde 1996; Parker and Tavassoli 
2000; Taylor 1964). This is why, rather than pitching OSL and self-verification against one 
another, we focus on finding predictions about process evidence for risk compensation theory 
that are supported by both accounts in an attempt to approach risk compensation theory as 
broadly as its instantiations. In doing so, we come up with two predictions about risk 
compensation. 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the existence of a target level of risk is a 
necessary condition for risk compensation to occur. The existence of such a target level is a first 
prediction shared between a self-verification account and an OSL account of risk compensation, 
because the assumed target level of risk could be either a reflection of a self-view (like one’s 
adventurousness, or one’s “balls”), or a reflection of an optimal level of stimulation below which 
assuming risk can accommodate a need for arousal. In an attempt to provide operational 
meaning to the otherwise theoretical construct of a target level of risk, we relate this target level 
to trait individual differences in risk preference. If this inference is valid, then our first 
prediction is that these preferences should moderate the extent to which risk compensation is 
triggered by a given situational cue. Compensation is most likely to occur at moderate levels of 
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target risk, where deviations can fall both below or above the target risk. Contrariwise, strong 
risk avoidance or risk seeking tendencies might reflect a target level of risk unlikely to be 
accommodated by the environment. Under most circumstances, strong risk avoiders might 
constantly be above their target level of risk, while strong risk seekers might constantly be 
below. Risk preferences at both ends of the scale might therefore not lead to compensation but 
to behavior consistent with the preference, and extreme risk preferences might therefore act as 
boundary conditions for risk compensation. We propose that: 
H1: Risk compensation is most likely to occur at moderate levels of target risk 
A second prediction based on a similarity between OSL and self-verification is that risk 
compensation is directed at the self, not at the situation that leads a person away from her target 
level of risk. This is true regardless of whether one is in need of stimulation due to a dull 
environment, or whether one tries to restore a self-view. This means that compensatory 
behavior can take place inside, but also outside of the environment where a need for 
compensation was encountered. Given this encounter, escaping to a different, potentially more 
exciting or self-verifying environment might even be preferable. It follows that: 
H2: Risk compensation can take place in a different environment than where it was triggered 
We conducted two studies to empirically verify these two hypotheses.   
STUDY 1 
As an important part of the literature about risk compensation deals with car driver 
behavior (Aschenbrenner and Biehl 1994; Peltzman 1975; Wilde 1989), and in line with other 
experimental work on this topic (Jackson and Blackman 1994) we opted for an experimental 
design related to car driving. We tested whether the perceived safety of a car the participants 
were driving effectively changed the way they drove this car. In line with the notion of risk 
compensation we expected that driving a safer car would lead to more risky driving behavior. 
Furthermore, we tested whether risk compensation happens more at moderate levels of target 
risk (H1). For this, we measured participants’ regulatory focus, consisting of promotion and 
prevention tendencies. High scores on promotion focus mean that people aspire accomplishment 
and are therefore more risk prone, whereas high scores on prevention focus mean that people 
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seek safety (Higgins 1997). Although of course (oppositely) related, people can score high or 
low at both scales at the same time, which is why regulatory focus is measured as two separate 
subscales of promotion and prevention focus. According to H1 risk compensation is more likely 
to occur at moderate levels of target risk. As high promotion focus corresponds to being risk 
prone, and high prevention focus to seeking safety, we conjecture that moderate levels of target 
risk correspond to low levels of both promotion and prevention focus. 
Material and Procedure 
Participants (n=49, 23 female, ages between 18 and 23) came individually to the lab for a 
20 minute session. First, participants received information on a computer screen, where they 
were explained the procedure. They were told we were studying people’s driving behavior in 
response to specific circumstances on the road, and were explained this study would take place 
in the driving simulator. Furthermore, they were shown a picture of the car they would be 
driving, which was either a big family car (a Toyota Avensis) or a small city car (a Toyota Yaris). 
At the time, both cars had five Euro NCAP stars, but no information about either car’s safety or 
about other properties of the car was given to avoid demand effects. Safety was therefore 
manipulated implicitly, based on the common heuristic that big cars are safer than small ones 
(Elvik 2004). Participants were then invited to take place in a driving simulator, and were 
allowed a first two minute drive on an open track to make them familiar with controlling the 
car. Then, they drove the car for 10 minutes along an indicated route with simulated normal 
traffic. For this second drive, the simulator measured parameters of participants’ driving 
behavior at a sample rate of five measurements per second, i.e. speed, acceleration, 
deceleration, throttle, and braking. After each ride, the simulation software provided averages 
of these measures that we used to assess driving intensity. 
Results and discussion 
The table below gives an overview of the results for each condition of our car 
manipulation. For each parameter, the results are higher in the big car condition than in the 
small car condition, although for speed and braking, this difference is not significant. 
Because some of the driving parameters (e.g. speed) were a magnitude bigger than others 
(e.g. braking, which is expressed as a percentage of the maximum braking force), we 
standardized all items. These standardized items made for one internally consistent construct 
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(Cronbach’s α = .90), so we averaged them into a single measure of driving intensity. Further 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of our safety manipulation where in line with risk 
compensation theory, the big, safe car led to a higher driving intensity (M = .23, SE =.16) than 
the small car (M = -.28, SE =.16; t(47) = 2.26, p <.05). Significant differences were found for 
all individual variables included in driving intensity, except for braking, which only shows a 
directional effect.  
 
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of driving measures per condition 
 Small Car Big Car 
Average Speed   
M 8.26 8;35 
SD .80 .69 
Average Deceleration***   
M 1.79 2.31 
SD .58 .62 
Average Acceleration**   
M 1.88 2.30 
SD .49 .58 
Average Throttle*   
M .25 .31 
SD .10 .11 
Average Braking   
M .16 .20 
SD .15 .13 
Note. Mean difference between conditions significant at * p < .05,  
** p < .01, *** p < .005.  
 
 A general linear model analysis of the data yielded no three-way interaction between car 
type, prevention, and promotion (F < 1, ns.). Analyzing the effects of promotion and prevention 
separately, we did find two significant two-way interactions that qualified the main effect of car 
type on driving intensity. 
First, we found a significant interaction between car type and promotion focus on driving 
intensity (F(1,42) = 4.36, p <.05). Only participants low in promotion focus seemed to be 
sensitive to the effect of car type. To examine in more detail this interaction, we conducted a 
spotlight analysis (Fitzsimons 2008; Irwin and McClelland 2001). At one standard deviation 
above the mean of promotion, no significant difference appeared in driving behavior between 
participants in the small car and those in the big car (Msmall = .23 and Mbig = .19, respectively; β 
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=-.05, SE =.32, t =-.14, ns). At one standard deviation below the mean of promotion however, 
participants in the big car seemed to drive more intensively (Msmall = -.69 and Mbig = .29, 
respectively; β =.99, SE =.31, t = 3.20, p <.005).Participants high in promotion focus seem to 
drive with relatively high intensity, no matter what car type. 
Second, and mirroring the previous result, we found a near significant interaction effect 
between car type and prevention focus (F(1, 42) = 3.09, p =.086). Again, we used spotlight 
analysis to find that at one standard deviation above the mean of prevention, no significant 
difference appeared in driving behavior between participants in the small car and those in the big 
car (Msmall = -.20 and Mbig = .02, respectively; β =.23, SE =.32, t =.70, ns). At one standard 
deviation below the mean of prevention however, participants in the big car seemed to drive 
more intensively (Msmall = -.33 and Mbig = .49, respectively; β =.83, SE =.32, t = 2.55, p <.05). 
Only participants that scored low on prevention focus seemed to be affected by car type, 
whereas people high in prevention focus seemed to drive cautiously, no matter what car they 
thought they were driving.  
 
Figure 8: Driving intensity in different car types moderated by regulatory focus. 
 
These results show that promotion and prevention focus can impose boundary conditions 
on risk compensation. Furthermore, and given the nature of promotion and prevention focus in 
terms of risk preference, they also support H1 by showing that risk compensation is most 
pronounced for people pursuing moderate target risk, thus demonstrating that risk 
compensation as a process depends on stable personality traits.  
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STUDY 2 
In study 2, we wanted to investigate whether risk compensation can occur across 
domains. If compensatory behavior is targeted at the self instead of a reaction directed at the cue 
that initiated the need for compensation, in principle it should not matter whether compensation 
occurs within or outside of the situation where this need was instigated. In this study we test 
whether a safety prime in one domain (cars) can lead to more risky behavior in an unrelated 
other domain (financial risk taking).  
Material and procedure 
For this study, we used a subtle prime of safety by having participants evaluate one of two 
car ads. Features of the car were briefly mentioned, and participants were asked to express their 
evaluation about the car in the ad on several dimensions, amongst which safety. The 
manipulation in this study consisted of the fact that, although both cars were from the same 
brand (Mercedes-Benz), one of them was objectively a very bulky and safe car (R-class), whereas 
the other one was famous for having failed a government issued safety test (A-class). After this 
part of the session, participants were told that the first task was finished, and were asked to 
move on to the next one, a task that comprised our dependent measure. 
As a dependent measure, we used an approximation of financial risk taking, which 
consisted of the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al. 2002), where participants 
receive 5ct for every time they push the pump that blows up a balloon, but lose all of their 
money on a specific balloon if it pops. Participants can thus cash out if they don’t want to take 
extra risk, or give an extra pump to increase their outcome, with the risk of popping the balloon 
and losing their money. This task was repeated over twenty balloons, the result on one balloon 
not affecting that of others. Participants (n=214, 126 female, ages between 18 and 27) came to 
the lab in groups of eight, and this latter task was made incentive compatible by randomly 
drawing one participant per session who actually won the money he or she made in the task. 
Results and discussion 
Results indicate that indeed, a safety prime can lead to more risk taking in an unrelated 
domain. Car type affected the average number of pumps participants put in balloons (the average 
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excluding balloons that popped) (Msmall = 14.83 and Mbig = 16.16, t = 3.52, p <.001). More 
importantly, our results indicate that in this case, this was due to the nature of safety of the 
prime. A mediation analysis applying a bootstrapping algorithm (Preacher and Hayes 2004; 
Shrout and Bolger 2002) revealed an indirect effect of car type on financial risk taken as 
measured by the BART task, mediated by the perception of safety of the car that participants had 
evaluated. A bootstrapped estimate of the indirect effect showed significance within a 95% 
confidence interval that did not include 0 (M = .41, SE = .18, LL =.11, UL =.85). Important for 
our theorizing, no similar results could be found for other model differentiating features that 
were subject to the participants’ evaluation like price, quality or performance. We therefore 
conclude that it was indeed the manipulation of car safety that caused risk seeking behavior in the 
unrelated domain of financial risk. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this research, we aimed to provide process evidence for the principle of risk 
compensation, a principle of which the existence is controversial (Dulisse 1997; Joksch 1976; 
Robertson 1984), but that at the same time seems to underlie some findings in consumer 
literature (Hsee and Weber 1999; Levav and Argo 2010). Consumers approach situations of risk 
with behavior that – given the nature of the situation in terms of potential benefits and costs – 
corresponds to a target level of risk of their behavior. If the risk imposed by the situation 
changes, then risk compensation theory predicts that people will change their behavior to 
counteract this change, and again come as close as possible to their target level of risk.  
Our theorizing was based on the similarities between two different theoretical accounts 
that might explain risk compensation. First, we argued that a target level of risk might be rooted 
in consumers’ self-concept, where they see themselves as rather careful and risk avoidant or 
rather adventurous and risk seeking. Consumers have a strong need to perceive themselves and 
act according to their self-concept, which is known as the need for self-verification (Cialdini and 
Trost 1998; Swann and Read 1981b). External threat to the integrity of consumers’ self-concept 
leads to a need to find support for the part of one’s self-concept that is under threat, which can 
be found by going against what is indicated by the threat (Gao et al. 2009). This fits the 
mechanism of risk compensation, where an external change is compensated by behavior. 
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Second, we found a similar compensatory mechanism in literature about optimal stimulation 
level (OSL)(Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1992; Steenkamp et al. 1996). As risk is associated 
with arousal, the finding that people try to maintain a target level of arousal by seeking more or 
less stimulation to compensate any deviation from this target level, seems to provide a clear 
theoretical bases for risk compensation. To accommodate the variety of findings supporting risk 
compensation, our studies focused on finding support for predictions that are supported by both 
theoretical accounts. 
In two studies, we provide experimental evidence for the existence of risk compensation 
in consumer decisions, complementing previous literature that mostly provided correlational 
evidence. Additionally, we provide process evidence for this effect. In study 1, we show that 
high promotion focus and high prevention focus make consumers less susceptible to risk 
compensation, thereby demonstrating boundary conditions for this effect. If consumers’ target 
risk is too far off the situation where they find themselves in, then a change in perceived risk that 
is still far from that target level will not lead to a difference in behavior. In this study, we do find 
risk compensation for participants with moderate levels of target risk. These findings might 
explain previous findings that show individual differences in the susceptibility to risk 
compensation (Stetzer and Hofmann 1996), and effectively seems to corroborate the existence 
of a target level of risk, a topic that is part of the controversy surrounding risk compensation 
(O'Neill and Williams 1998). 
In a second study, we demonstrate the occurrence of risk compensation across domains, 
and we show that this effect is mediated by perceived risk in the domain where risk was 
manipulated. This finding demonstrates that risk compensation as a process should be seen as 
responding to an active personal need, and thus directed at the self rather than at the 
environmental stimulus that instigated this need. Relating this finding to OSL theory, it is easy to 
see how boredom from lack of stimulation in one environment might be solved by seeking 
stimulation in a different environment. Relating this finding to self-verification theory on the 
other hand, literature shows indeed that threats to the stability of self-views can be counteracted 
both by countering the threatening nature of the stimulus itself (i.e. compensation directed at 
the stimulus) (Fein and Spencer 1997; Greve and Wentura 2003), as well as by finding support 
for the threatened self-view regardless of the stimulus (i.e. directed at the self) (Gao et al. 2009; 
Rucker and Galinsky 2008). Accordingly, in study 1 we find that participants’ behavior 
effectively changes the safety of the use of the car (i.e. compensation directed at the stimulus), 
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whereas in study 2, participants compensate with financial risk seeking that contradicts a cue in a 
different setting (i.e. directed at the self).  
As mentioned, our theorizing to come to these results was based both self-verification 
theory and OSL theory. An important question we fail to answer is whether of the two 
theoretical accounts we introduced, one is more valid to explain risk compensation. Our 
findings do not allow us to make claims about this, as they are based on – and support – both 
accounts. Future studies will be conducted to find out whether evidence can invalidate one of 
the two a theoretical foundation for risk compensation. However, we do preserve the additional 
possibility that both accounts are valid, each of them explaining different modalities of this 
phenomenon. As risk compensation seems to occur as a visceral reaction as well as following a 
cognitive elaboration, this general principle might in fact reflect a collection of related effects, 
each requiring an explanation that takes into account the specificities of the instance of risk 
compensation at hand. While we found it important to focus on the general principles governing 
risk compensation first, future research might well take a more focused approach.  
Our theoretical contribution is in adding to the understanding of risk compensation in 
terms of its situational and dispositional drivers, the latter being necessary to establish its place in 
the realm of relevant consumer effects. Previous work on risk compensation in consumer 
settings is scarce (e.g. Bolton et al. 2006). However, literature basing its theorizing on the same 
logic as risk compensation can be found more easily. Physical contact that evokes a motherly 
touch leads to feelings of safety, which in turn lead to increased financial risk seeking (Levav and 
Argo 2010). Variety seeking increases with positive mood and when alternatives are considered 
as rather safe (Kahn and Isen 1993). Our work can provide a theoretical framework for findings 
like these, further facilitating new theorizing based on seeing risk compensation as identity 
threat. 
Additionally, we contribute to the debate in the literature about whether such a concept 
as risk homeostasis (RH), with requirements stronger than risk compensation, exists (Stetzer 
and Hofmann 1996). RHT would predict that the compensation in behavior is equal to the 
change in risk in the situation, so that the total risk assumed stays the same (Wilde 1982). An 
example of an implication is that not a single intervention in, for instance, infrastructure would 
have the power to increase objective road safety in the long run. Only interventions that affect 
the target level of risk people want to accept could achieve this (Wilde 1989). This position has 
received much critique, claiming that the existing evidence in for instance traffic deaths refutes 
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the theory (Evans 1986; O'Neill and Williams 1998). While our findings do not allow us to 
make claims about whether risk homeostasis is an accurate description of reality, they do 
indicate that a lack of complete risk compensation in a given domain of risk might be explained 
by compensation outside of that domain. Failure to find complete compensation might therefore 
not be a valid basis to claim that the theory is incorrect. While it may be true that traffic deaths 
have known a steady decline due to the introduction of mandatory safety features (O'Neill and 
Williams 1998), people might not only engage in more reckless behavior within domain – i.e. 
adjust their driving style –, but also engage more in extreme sports to compensate some of this 
mandatory change across domain. People might be stuck in a job that doesn’t give them the 
thrills they would prefer, and compensate for that by reckless car driving, gambling or engaging 
in extreme sports. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that individual differences exist in 
target risk, and that some people end up with what others might consider a dull job are there 
because they choose to be. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
THE SELF AND POSSESSIONS 
Do the clothes actually make the man? Probably (and fortunately) not, although 
throughout this manuscript, we do demonstrate that taking them away might make the man feel 
uncomfortably naked.  
As our self-concept primarily consists of interpretations for why we display the behavior 
we do (Markus 1977; Wegner 2008), the role of possessions in this self-concept is rather 
illustrative than defining. Nevertheless, William James’ (1890) quote that “a man's Self is the sum 
total of all that he CAN call his” stresses the strong relationship between the self and possessions in 
their broadest possible sense, and has lost little of its relevance more than a century after it was 
written. In fact, it provides a basic rationale for most of the findings reported here. Beyond 
providing a person with shelter and safety in the physical world, or serving as tools to make our 
lives easier and increase our standard of living, possessions also support our identity, by 
representing our values and attitudes (Prentice 1987), our position on the social ladder 
(Ordabayeva and Chandon 2011), our aspirations and desires (Dittmar 1992; Wicklund and 
Gollwitzer 1982), our past experiences and accomplishments (Belk 1990; Burris and Rempel 
2004), and even our future selves (Sirgy 1982).  
Illustrative to the lasting relevance of James’ quote is the current and growing interest in 
the two domains that this quote combines: ownership and self-concept or identity. Ownership is 
probably one of the defining topics of study in consumer research (Macinnis and Folkes 2010), 
and recently benefited from a surge of studies approaching ownership as a continuous, mental 
phenomenon rather than a dichotomous, observable fact (Dommer and Swaminathan 2013; 
Morewedge et al. 2009; Peck and Shu 2009; Reb and Connolly 2007; Shu and Peck 2011). As a 
topic of study, identity-based consumer behavior has been mentioned as crucial to understanding 
the meaning of consumer choices (Macinnis and Folkes 2010) and has received a considerably 
increasing interest in the last two decades (Reed et al. 2012). Although in principle these two 
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domains can perfectly be studied independently, with James (1890) we too ventured into the 
myriad of interactions between the self on one hand, and consumption and possessions on the 
other hand, resulting in the three essays that constitute this manuscript. In essay one, we come 
to a more explicit understanding of the mental representation and processing of possessions on 
the one hand, and of the association between possessions and the self that is ownership on the 
other hand. A second essay studies whether feedback on people’s consumer choices and 
preferences can actually be perceived as self-threat, which indeed, we find. While essay 2 studies 
social feedback, essay 3 looks at situational cues related to risk as feedback to the self-concept. In 
this essay we conclude that people seek self-verification by counteracting situational cues that are 
incongruent with their risk preferences. After a summary of the findings, we will discuss 
implications and suggest venues for future investigation at these crossroads of topics.  
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
Essay 1 
Much of the literature on ownership in our domain is based on the endowment effect 
(Kahneman et al. 1991; Thaler 1980), the finding that (in most cases) immediately upon being 
endowed with an object, a shift upwards in valuation takes place, so that the willingness to 
accept an offer for that object as a seller is higher than what one would have been willing to pay 
for that same object as a buyer. This is a clear and measurable effect, but it is based on a 
transaction, and might not be ideal for the study of ownership as a continuous psychological 
state, of which the conceptualization is far less clear. From a practical perspective, this is 
understandable: endowment is in most cases readily observable, while a psychological state is 
harder to assess. Nevertheless, literature suggests that many of the known effects of endowment 
might in reality be driven by the psychological state, regardless of factual endowment (Dommer 
and Swaminathan 2013; Morewedge et al. 2009; Shu and Peck 2011). Current definitions of 
ownership generally describe the concept as an association between a person and an object 
(Ahuvia 2005; Beggan and Brown 1994; Pierce et al. 2003) or attachment (Ball and Tasaki 1992; 
Wallendorf and Arnould 1988), which seems ecologically valid, but also has some shortcomings. 
In its current conceptualization in literature, ownerships seems to be defined in a descriptive 
way, which is hard to translate into operational constructs and measures, and is poorly 
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connected to other literature about psychological effects. An additional observation – potentially 
related to the previous – is that literature about topics related to ownership seems to suffer from 
a lack of integration and consensus even at the most fundamental level. Some of these topics 
include psychological ownership (Peck and Shu 2009; Pierce et al. 2003), materialism (Belk 
1985; Richins and Dawson 1992), territorialism (Brown et al. 2005a), the previously mentioned 
endowment effect (Kahneman et al. 1991; Thaler 1980), mere ownership effect (Beggan 1992), 
and the theory about extended self (Belk 1988) – all of which would benefit from a more 
elaborate theoretical integration or common ground. 
In essay one, we attempt to present a more clear conceptualization of ownership and 
possessions as mental constructs, based on the well-established framework of Construal Level 
Theory (CLT) and psychological distance (Trope and Liberman 2010). We show that ownership 
is associated with lower levels of construal, and that in turn, processing objects at low construal 
level can create feelings of ownership. This helps us understand possessions as mentally 
represented in a concrete, vivid, detailed, focused way, with the additional effect that they are 
seen as more unique by their owners. Based on perceived scarcity (Brock 1968; Lynn 1991), this 
finding in itself might therefore explain the endowment effect. Furthermore, we find that 
ownership is interrelated with dimensions of psychological distance. Combined, these findings 
lead us to the conclusion that ownership qualifies as a dimension of psychological distance, next 
to other known dimensions like physical distance, social distance, time, and probability. Our 
possessions are therefore mentally literally as close to us as friends, the place where we live, and 
other highly vivid and central entities in our lives. 
What’s more, our findings might also reconcile an understanding of “normal” and 
functional ownership phenomena to literature that discusses what happens when ownership 
becomes dysfunctional or even pathological. The development of feelings of ownership is an 
important developmental step, as in early life, developing a sense of self goes hand in hand with 
letting go of symbiosis with mostly the mother (Damon and Hart 1991), and distinguishing 
ourselves from our environment and others in general (Neisser 1991). Crucial in this distinction 
is the amount of control that we are able to execute, resulting not only in the distinction 
between what is “us” and “not us”, but also what is “ours” and “not ours” (Furby 1980; Furby and 
Wilke 1982). This makes it understandable how the development of feelings of ownership 
correlate with the development of a sense of self, starting at very early age (Fasig 2000), but 
persisting throughout the different stages of life (Allport 1937; Dixon and Street 1975). 
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Possessions might be the tangible representations of our ungraspable, magic self (Wegner 2008). 
Nevertheless, people can also (quite literally) lose themselves (their selves) in their possessions, 
in which case ownership becomes dysfunctional. Hoarding a collection of possessions can come 
at the cost of attention to one’s loved ones (Belk 1995), or empathy with others in general 
(Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002), and generally leads to an exaggerated self-involvement, in the 
here and now (also see Richins 2011), which seems to map very well on an exaggerated form of 
low mental level of construal, and thus on the ownership effects we find in this first essay. 
Essay 2 
While in essay 1, investigate the nature of the association between the self and objects that 
is ownership, essay 2 in a way demonstrates how this association can become a source of self-
threat when it receives negative feedback by others. As possessions reflect the choices and 
preferences of which they are the outcome, essay 2 investigates self-threat as an effect of 
feedback on one’s consumer choices or preferences. At first sight, one might wonder how 
feedback about a specific consumer good or service can constitute a threat at all. Nevertheless, 
essay 1 allows us to understand more clearly that possessions, and by extension the attitudes and 
preferences that they represent (Prentice 1987), are highly involving and reflective of the self. 
Even uttering a preference without the actual choice can put the self under public scrutiny 
(Olivero 2004). Because this scrutiny can result in negative feedback, people even pro-actively 
engage in taking protective, compensatory measures to buffer their selves (Greenberg and 
Pyszczynski 1985).  
As an instance of submitting oneself to public scrutiny, we thought of the process of giving 
consumer advice to others. In Essay 2, we focused on how the outcome of advice can affect the 
sender of the advice, hypothesizing that a rejection of advice can question the person giving the 
advice, or at least that person’s choices. As discussed, the latter might be equally threatening to 
the self. Building on literature that shows how self-threat invokes compensatory reactions and a 
need for self-determination (Blanton and Christie 2003; Deci and Ryan 1985; Nail et al. 2000), 
we conjectured that upon this threat, people would be more motivated to self-verify in terms of 
self-sufficiency in making consumer decisions. This would lead to the effect that referral failure 
leads to a lower propensity to take external sources into account in decisions subsequently 
made. In our studies reported in this essay, we indeed find support for this effect. Furthermore, 
after referral failure we observe an increase in implicit egotism, which is a compensatory 
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mechanism designed to protect one’s self-concept (Buhrmester et al. 2011; Rudman et al. 
2007). Importantly, the effect only seems to hold when the domain of advice is seen as relevant 
for one’s self-concept, further corroborating our theorizing. An important implication is that in 
consumer settings, coping mechanisms for self-threat can not only rely on specific consumer 
choices (Gao et al. 2009; Sivanathan and Pettit 2010), but also on the way of choosing, 
something that will be developed further in the discussion of essay 3.  
In hindsight, we might be able to relate these findings to those of essay 1. A lower 
propensity to “reach out”, have a broad view on the situation and any information available, and 
instead choosing for self-sufficiency and a narrow self-focus, could very easily be related to a low 
level of self-construal. One might therefore wonder whether, next to defending the self, a 
consumer experiencing referral failure is not also highly involved in the specific possession or 
consumer choice that is not endorsed by the person who has received the advice. In this context 
it might be illustrative to mention the case of the Apple Newton, the first PDA to enter the 
market, which after a problematic launch eventually even failed to receive the endorsement of 
its marketer and was discontinued, handing over the market to Palm (Muñiz and Schau 2005). A 
product losing the endorsement of its creator is an extreme case of negative feedback on a 
consumer choice for people who had actually purchased the product. What was found by Muñiz 
and Schau (2005), was that after the product being discontinued, a relatively large group of users 
(still about 10% of the peak number after four years) had organized themselves around the brand 
in online communities, heavily focusing on its qualities, even inflating them to extreme 
proportions, and engaging in an experience that the authors themselves qualify as “religious”. 
This is of course an extreme case, but based on our findings of essays 1 and 2, in the light of 
negative feedback on one’s possessions it of course makes sense to not only defend one’s self-
concept, but also a product that can support it. 
Essay 3 
As our general introduction of this manuscript highlighted, one’s self-concept is not 
limited to a collection of possessions. Rather, it is a post-hoc reconstruction of who we are by 
the interpretation of our actions (Baumeister 1998; Markus 1977; Markus and Wurf 1987). 
Those actions themselves, and how they are interpreted, can therefore threaten or support the 
self-concept. Essay 2 for instance demonstrates that the act of making a consumer decision can 
become an act of self-verification. In essay 2, self-verification comes from modalities of the 
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decision process – in this case that the process was not influenced externally. Much like the fact 
that choices can support the self, they also expose it, making it vulnerable to threat. When 
looking at consumer choices, threat to this self-concept can come from social feedback directed 
to our choices, our possessions or even our selves. However, it can also come from performing 
behavior that is not in line with one’s self concept, and therefore creates internal tension. 
External circumstances might influence behavior so that it is not in line with the self-concept, or 
even opposes it. Consider the case of a shopper who wants to be frugal (in line with his or her 
self-concept), and buy the private label batteries displayed next to the Duracell and Energizer 
batteries in a store aisle. Literature indicates that this shopper might succumb to social pressure 
as implicit as a single other shopper standing moderately near, minding his or her own business, 
to go for the more expensive premium brands after all (Argo, Dahl, and Manchanda 2005). 
Consider also the example of buying a present for someone else. You might try to set aside your 
own preferences and try to infer those of the intended gift receiver as good as you can to come 
to a choice that might totally violate your own self-concept (and in spite of your efforts is likely 
to be wrong, Lerouge and Warlop 2006). Or, consider a situation where your favorite choice is 
simply not available for consideration, because it is out of stock, above budget, or otherwise 
unavailable. Lastly, many of us would like to see ourselves as adventurous and thus make choices 
and do things in line with this self-concept. Unfortunately, the options for adventure in daily life 
are limited. Based on our introduction, it makes sense to predict compensatory self-verification 
following these uncomfortable situations. As a specific case in essay 3, we focused on risk 
compensation (Peltzman 1975). This literature – situated mostly in literature about traffic 
regulation – claims that changes in the environment designed to reduce risk, have an offsetting 
effect in the behavior of people entering this environment, so that the reduction is partially or 
completely compensated. This theory received some backlash for its lack of theoretical backing, 
lack of process evidence, methodological issues with evidence supporting the theory, and the 
existence of evidence arguing against it (Lund and O'Neill 1986; O'Neill and Williams 1998). 
Given this backlash, the safest position is probably to say that the evidence for this theory is 
mixed. What is interesting to see however, is that without necessarily explicitly building on this 
theory, a number of findings in consumer literature could be seen as in support of the existence 
of risk compensation (Bolton et al. 2006; Hsee and Weber 1999; Levav and Argo 2010), which 
is why we thought it deserved further investigation. Based on our conceptualization of risk 
compensation as self-verification, corroborated by theory about optimal stimulation level 
(Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1992; Steenkamp et al. 1996), we predicted that we should be 
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able to find process evidence relating to stable, core personality features dealing with risk 
attitude, and additionally that risk compensation should span the boundaries of the domain 
where it originated. Both these predictions were supported by our results. Although the 
conceptualization we proposed should be developed further, these findings provide a 
theoretically sound framework for looking at risk compensation. What’s more, they 
theoretically open up the possibility for complete compensation of the externally induced 
change, or even for compensation surpassing the magnitude of this change, keeping in mind that 
the compensation can occur outside of the domain of change. This last implication might be 
important in interpreting what by some is seen as counterevidence against risk compensation or 
risk homeostasis (Wilde 1982). 
CLOSING THOUGHTS 
While we discussed many implications and relations to existing literature of our own 
work at the crossroads of literature on the self-concept and that about possessions and 
ownership, many questions remain unanswered. As some of the theories and concepts to which 
we contributed in this manuscript have been around for more than a century, it is only natural 
that they take time to develop. In fact, it is actually remarkable that some of the authors who 
built the foundation for some of the ideas we tested made theoretical predictions that only 
recently became the subject of empirical scrutiny. Next to James (1890), we are also indebted to 
Litwinski (1947) for shaping the theoretical field on which we build. Apart from conceptually 
developing the theoretical link between possessions and the self, he proposed his own version of 
risk compensation before the term was coined. Litwinski conjectured that, as possessions 
provide their owners with what today we would probably call self-affirmatory resources 
(Sivanathan and Pettit 2010) owners feel comfortable in seeking a bit of risk by conspicuously 
displaying their possessions (for instance the risk of having these possessions stolen or 
damaged)(for a discussion see also Rudmin 1990). A prediction that even today would be 
interesting to test.  
Given the tradition and recent advances of research in this domain, it would probably be 
naïve to think that the ongoing debate between supporters of different theoretical accounts 
related to ownership will be solved in the near future, let alone by the content of this 
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manuscript. Nor would this be desirable, as the multitude of methodological approaches and 
theoretical accounts is an intrinsic quality of the field of consumer science (Holbrook 1987; 
Macinnis and Folkes 2010), and probably gave us the multifaceted view on topics like the self-
concept and ownership we have today. It also gives us access to findings from rapidly developing 
fields like for instance that of neuroscience. Ironically, some of the debates and lack of 
integration present in our field continues in those other domains. For example in neuroscience, 
findings are reported related to the endowment effect both in support of a loss-aversion 
explanation (De Martino et al. 2009; Knutson et al. 2008), an ownership explanation (Turk et 
al. 2011), and related to ownership to some extent even in support of our own 
conceptualization of this phenomenon (Newen and Vogeley 2003). In spite of this, we believe 
that many opportunities exist for future research to resolve some of these debates by considering 
ownership and its transitions based on their core, fundamental, psychological features.  
A very concrete last illustration of the strong interrelation between the self and 
possessions comes from a medical case reported on by Aglioti et al. (1996). They describe a 
patient who had suffered a right hemisphere stroke, resulting at first sight in left hemisoma 
neglect with strong denial of ownership of her left hand. Illustrative of this was the fact that she 
had asked her son to remind the doctors to take away the hand that they had left in her bed. The 
patient seemed to have normal cognitive capabilities in terms of memory and orientation. 
Striking however was, that with denial of ownership of her left hand she also denied ownership 
of objects that were put on this hand, like rings that she usually wore, whether usually worn on 
this left hand or on the right hand. When she didn’t wear these objects, she was perfectly able to 
describe their history and personal meaning, but when put on her left hand she failed to 
recognize them. This case might illustrate the profound nature and implications of the 
relationship between a person and an object we call ownership, and especially the fact that this 
relationship blurs the distinction between what is “me” and what is “mine”. Owning might be a 
connection as physical as touching an object (see also Peck and Shu 2009), or even integrating 
the object into the body schema (like is the case with tool use, see Maravita and Iriki 2004), and 
this case goes to show that ownership is as deeply encrypted in the wiring of the human body as 
that body itself. The case discussed by Aglioti et al. (1996) is only one example of many that 
show the potential for additional interesting findings at the intersection of the self-concept and 
possessions. The future for this stream of literature looks bright. We hope to have contributed 
to this development.  
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